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The Development of Intellectual Disabilities
in United States Capital Cases and the
Modern Application of Moore v. Texas to
State Court Decisions
Dr. Alexander Updegrove
16 U. MASS. L. REV. 2

ABSTRACT
Although in 1989 the Supreme Court of the United States initially held that the Eighth
Amendment did not prohibit executing persons with intellectual disabilities in Penry
v. Lynaugh, in 2002 it subsequently reversed this decision in Atkins v. Virginia, citing
changing state legislation. Since the Atkins decision, state courts have interpreted the
Court’s Atkins provisions in a variety of ways, some more faithfully than others. As a
result, the Court provided additional clarification in its 2014 and 2015 Hall v. Florida
and Brumfield v. Cain decisions, ruling that states must apply a Standard Error of
Measurement of +5/-5 to all capital defendant IQ test scores. Despite this requirement,
some state courts still delivered opinions contrary to the Court’s Atkins and Hall
holdings, prompting the Court to offer yet more guidance in 2017. In Moore v. Texas
I, the Court established that states must evaluate intellectual disabilities in capital
defendants according to current medical standards, which include: (1) using the
diagnostic criteria outlined in the DSM-5 or AAIDD-11; (2) focusing on adaptive
deficits, not strengths; and (3) prohibiting determinations of intellectual disability from
being based on functioning in prison. In 2019 the Court determined in Moore v. Texas
II that the analysis undertaken by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals continued to
offend Court precedent. Given the long history of some state courts disregarding clear
holdings of the Supreme Court, this Article examines how state courts have interpreted
Moore I and Moore II.
AUTHOR’S NOTE
Alexander H. Updegrove is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal
Justice at the University of North Texas. His scholarship focuses on the death penalty
and public perceptions of criminal justice issues. This Article is dedicated to Rolando
V. del Carmen and Michael S. Vaughn. This Article is also dedicated to Peggy M.
Tobolowsky, for her incredible legal scholarship on intellectual disability among
persons sentenced to death.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited executing persons with intellectual disabilities in Atkins v.
Virginia,1 subsequent state court interpretations of the case have
compelled the Court to revisit aspects of the intellectual disability
analysis on numerous occasions. One reason for this could be that the
state courts must interpret the written opinions of the Court. This creates
the possibility for errors as, inevitably, some state court opinions will
adhere more closely to the Supreme Court’s principles in their
interpretations than others. Misinterpretations by state courts may occur,
sometimes due to genuine confusion, other times due to bad faith
motivated by conflicting ideologies. When confronted with especially
egregious interpretations from state courts, the Supreme Court is forced
to intervene and provide clarification. Such was the case in Moore v.
Texas I,2 where the Court ordered Texas to evaluate capital defendants
for intellectual disabilities using current medical criteria rather than the
nonmedical Briseno factors.3 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
(CCA) introduced the Briseno factors in 2004 based on the character
Lennie Small from John Steinbeck’s fictional novel Of Mice and Men.4
1
2
3

4

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Moore v. Texas (Moore I), 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8–9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), overruled by Moore
I, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017). The Briseno factors aid the factfinders’ assessment with
guiding questions such as: “Did those who knew the person best during the
developmental stage, his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities, think
he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that
determination?” Id. at 8. “Has the person formulated plans and carried them
through or is his conduct impulsive?” Id. “Does his conduct show leadership or
does it show that he is led around by others?” Id. “Is his conduct in response to
external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially
acceptable?” Id. “Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or
written questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject?” Id. “Can
the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests?” Id. And
finally, “[p]utting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital
offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and
complex execution of purpose?” Id. at 8–9.
See JOHN STEINBECK, OF MICE AND MEN (Penguin Books 1993) (1937)
(Throughout the novel, Lennie Small is portrayed as a simple-minded person who
enjoys petting soft materials. Being a large person, Lennie unintentionally kills
several animals as a result of petting them. Toward the end of the novel, Lennie
finds himself in a situation where he is provided a chance to pet the hair of his
boss’s daughter-in-law. As with the animals, Lennie’s strength proves fatal.); see
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After the Court remanded the case to the Texas CCA with instructions
to reassess Moore’s intellectual ability in a manner consistent with
Moore I, the Texas CCA again found him intellectually able, and
therefore eligible for execution.5 On February 19, 2019, the Supreme
Court determined that the Texas CCA had misinterpreted its earlier
ruling.6 In order to prevent further misinterpretations, the Court held that
Moore was intellectually disabled, and therefore entitled to execution
relief.7
This Article begins by reviewing relevant Supreme Court rulings on
intellectual disabilities in capital cases. Part III then identifies state court
cases from the twenty-eight death penalty states8 that have cited Moore
v. Texas I or Moore v. Texas II to examine how state courts are
interpreting and applying these Supreme Court cases. Special attention
is given to state court cases that appear inconsistent with clear
instructions from the Court on intellectual disabilities. Finally, this
Article concludes by summarizing the issues raised by state courts postMoore I and classifying them in two categories: (1) issues the Court has
clearly ruled on; and (2) issues requiring additional clarification from
the Court.
II. SUPREME COURT CASES ON INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES IN
CAPITAL CASES
A. Penry v. Lynaugh (1989)
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit states from executing persons with

5

6
7
8

also Julia Barton, Judging Steinbeck’s Lennie, LIFE OF THE LAW (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://www.lifeofthelaw.org/2013/09/judging-steinbeck-lennie/
[https://perma.cc/TD2Q-5TJL].
Ex parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), rev’d, Moore v. Texas,
139 S. Ct. 666 (2019).
Moore v. Texas (Moore II), 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) (per curiam).
Id. at 668.
See Death Penalty Information Center, States with and Without the Death
Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty
[https://perma.cc/P5ZP-BB78?type=image]. (The 28 states that still retain the
death penalty are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.).
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intellectual disabilities.9 Penry exhibited “an IQ between 50 and 63,”
and the evidence presented suggested “that Penry suffered from organic
brain damage” originating from either birth or “beatings and multiple
injuries to the brain” experienced in his early childhood.10 State experts
disputed some of the conclusions drawn by the defense, but conceded
“that Penry was a person of extremely limited mental ability.”11 In its
decision, the Court observed that a “rational juror” might “conclude that
Penry was less morally” responsible for the crime in question because
of his intellectual disability.12 The Court found that the jurors in Penry’s
case lacked an opportunity to incorporate “the mitigating evidence of
Penry’s mental retardation”13 into their sentencing decision.14 Thus, the
case was remanded with instructions to hold a new sentencing hearing.15
The Court proceeded to address whether it was cruel and unusual
punishment to execute persons who have intellectual disabilities. In its
opinion, the Court granted that “the common law prohibition against
punishing ‘idiots’ for their crime suggests” that executing “profoundly
or severely retarded” persons constitutes a cruel and unusual
punishment.16 Nevertheless, the Court thought that “the protections
afforded by the insanity defense” rendered the possibility of conviction
or punishment “[un]likely.”17 Additionally, the Court had previously
determined that states must afford “the insane” execution relief.18 The
Court reasoned that because the trial court found Penry competent to
stand trial,19 he did not meet the criteria for insanity detailed in Ford v.

9

10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 307–09.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323. Based on a rule cited in the Federal Register by the Social Security
Administration on August 1, 2013, the term “mental retardation” has now been
changed to “intellectual disability.” Change in Terminology: “Mental
Retardation” to “Intellectual Disability,” 78 Fed. Reg. 46499 (Aug. 1, 2013) (to
be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416). The change took effect on September 3,
2013. Id.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 323.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 333.
Id.
Id. at 334 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 n.2 (1986)).
Id. at 333.
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Wainwright.20 Furthermore, the trial jury did not deem Penry’s insanity
claim credible.21 The Court declined to recognize a national consensus
against executing persons with intellectual disabilities because at the
time only two states had legislation outlawing the practice.22 In contrast,
when the Court decided Ford, twenty-six states had legislation
prohibiting the execution of insane persons.23
In Penry, the Court considered whether executing persons with
intellectual disabilities “would be cruel and unusual because it is
disproportionate to [their] degree of personal culpability.”24 In doing so,
the Court acknowledged that “[i]t is clear that mental retardation has
long been regarded as a factor that may diminish an individual’s
culpability for a criminal act.”25 The Court, however, held that while
“the sentencing body must be allowed to consider mental retardation”
as a mitigating circumstance, “the record before the Court” precluded a
finding that all persons with intellectual disabilities “lack the cognitive,
volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability
associated with the death penalty.”26 The Court arrived at this decision
because intellectual disabilities vary from person to person, and the
current medical consensus at the time suggested that some of the
adaptive deficits caused by intellectual disabilities could be improved in
select individuals.27 While the Court described intellectual disability as
“a factor that may well lessen a defendant’s culpability,” it declined to
hold executing capital defendants with intellectual disabilities as

20

21
22

23
24
25
26
27

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 412 (1986). When Justice Powell concurred
with the plurality in Ford that the Eighth Amendment forbid executing “the
insane,” he proposed defining insanity as “those who are unaware of the
punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.” Id. at 422
(Powell, J., concurring).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 310.
Id. at 334. (Georgia and Maryland. Georgia’s law was already in effect at the time
of Penry v. Lynaugh, while Maryland’s law was set to take effect on July 1, 1989.)
Id.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 337–38.
Id. at 338 (“[T]he consequences of a retarded person’s mental impairment,
including the deficits in his or her adaptive behavior, ‘may be ameliorated through
education and habilitation.’“ (quoting James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson,
Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 424 n.54
(1985))).
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unconstitutional “by virtue of [a defendant’s] mental retardation
alone.”28
Justice Brennan concurred that states must provide jurors with an
opportunity to consider “all mitigating evidence,” including claims of
intellectual disability, before issuing a death sentence.29 Brennan
disagreed with the majority in part because he thought that the Eighth
Amendment required the Court to prohibit states from executing
persons with intellectual disabilities. Specifically, Brennan contended
that the Court had previously established the standard for determining
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual in Solem v. Helm.30 In that
case, the Court ruled that “the gravity of the offense and the harshness
of the penalty” must be weighed against each other when determining
punishments.31 Alternatively, these two factors can be understood as
“the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the
culpability of the offender[,]” respectively.32 Since people with
intellectual disabilities possess a lower degree of culpability, Brennan
reasoned that the Court’s standard for assessing whether a punishment
is cruel and unusual compelled a finding that intellectually disabled
defendants must receive a sentence lighter than the ultimate punishment,
death.33
Brennan acknowledged that “[f]or many purposes, legal and
otherwise, to treat the mentally retarded as a homogeneous group is
inappropriate” because that classification creates “the risk of false
stereotyping and unwarranted discrimination.”34 Nevertheless, the
definition of intellectual disability supplied by then-current clinical
manuals applied equally to whoever satisfied the qualifying criteria.
Citing the clinical manual’s definition of intellectual disability, Brennan
asserted that anyone who met the qualifying criteria exhibited
subaverage intellectual functioning and adaptive deficits. Based on this
“clinical definition of mental retardation,” Brennan argued that the
observed variation in intellectual disabilities cited by the majority was
irrelevant because each still satisfied the criteria for intellectual
28
29
30
31
32
33

34

Id. at 340.
Id. at 341 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
Id. at 290–91.
Id. at 292.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“death is different in kind from
any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice.”).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
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disability.35 Additionally, while some individuals with a milder form of
intellectual disability may “be quite capable of overcoming” adaptive
deficits, clinical understandings of intellectual disabilities clarified that
those individuals are still limited in their ability to operate in society.36
With this in mind, Brennan concluded that:
[t]he impairment of a mentally retarded offender’s reasoning
abilities, control over impulsive behavior, and moral development
in my view limits his or her culpability so that, whatever other
punishment might be appropriate, the ultimate penalty of death is
always and necessarily disproportionate to his or her
blameworthiness and hence is unconstitutional.37

Beyond this, Brennan argued that allowing jurors to consider
defendants’ intellectual disabilities during the sentencing phase would
not adequately protect them from death sentences.38 Worse yet, the
practice of executing people with intellectual disabilities “does not
measurably further the penal goals of either retribution or deterrence.”39
Brennan expressed his view in light of the Court’s previous
determination that, “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of
the criminal offender.”40 Exempting from execution those who—by the
very nature of their diagnosis—are unlikely to be deterred would not
detract from the deterrent effect that the punishment has on the general
population.41
Justice Stevens wrote separately, agreeing with the majority that an
Eighth Amendment prohibition against executing persons with
intellectual disabilities, if ever established, should be applied
retroactively.42 Stevens was ultimately persuaded by the brief submitted

35
36
37
38
39
40

41
42

Id. at 345.
Id. at 345–46.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 348.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987). See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 800 (1982) (“As for retribution as a justification for executing [defendant],
we think this very much depends on the degree of [defendant’s] culpability—what
[defendant’s] intentions, expectations, and actions were.”).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 347–49 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
Id. at 349 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
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by the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR).43 In their
brief, the AAMR addressed then-current medical understandings of
intellectual disabilities and argued that according to those standards, it
was “unconstitutional” to execute defendants with intellectual
disabilities.44
Justice Scalia agreed with the majority’s basic description of the
case facts but rejected their reasoning for declining to exempt persons
with intellectual disabilities from execution.45 Specifically, Scalia
asserted that to trigger Eighth Amendment protections a punishment
must be both “cruel and unusual.”46 Because the Court determined there
was no national consensus against executing persons with intellectual
disabilities, consideration of the issue should have stopped there.47
Additionally, Scalia disagreed with the Court’s requirement that states
provide jurors with an opportunity to consider a defendant’s alleged
intellectual disabilities as a mitigating factor during the sentencing
phase.48
B. Atkins v. Virginia (2002)
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court again considered whether
the Eighth Amendment prohibited executing persons with intellectual
disabilities. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and noted that,
“[b]ecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and
control of their impulses,” persons with intellectual disabilities “do not
act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious
adult criminal conduct.”49 When discussing the details of the case, the
Court noted that an expert for the defense reported Atkins’ IQ to be 59,
therefore indicating an intellectual disability.50 In contrast, the state’s
expert found Atkins intellectually able and suggested that he was
actually suffering from antisocial personality disorder.51 This
juxtaposition of diagnoses illustrates the Court’s finding that
43

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

The American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) is now the American
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 350 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
Id. at 350–51 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
Id. at 351 (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989)).
Id.
Id. at 351–52.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002).
Id. at 308–09.
Id. at 309.
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“impairments [of intellectually disabled individuals] can jeopardize the
reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against” them.52
To determine whether a punishment is “excessive” the Court looks
to “those [societal standards] that currently prevail” rather than those in
existence at the enactment of the Bill of Rights.53 Therefore, the Court’s
“proportionality review” must take place “under those evolving
standards.”54 In the thirteen years since deciding Penry, the Court found
that “the state legislative landscape” had experienced a “dramatic
shift.”55 The shift was characterized by “the consistency of the direction
of change” instead of the total number of states prohibiting the execution
of intellectually disabled people.56 The Court considered “anticrime
legislation” as “far more popular than legislation providing protections
for persons guilty of violent crime.”57 Accordingly, the legislative shift
was interpreted as “powerful evidence that today our society views
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the
average criminal.”58 Therefore, the Court concluded that “the
practice . . . has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national
consensus has developed against it.”59
Having firmly established a constitutional protection for those with
intellectual disabilities, the Court suggested that the dilemma faced by
many states stemmed from “serious disagreement” over “which
offenders [were] in fact” intellectually disabled.”60 Considering
precedent on this issue, the Court saddled the states with “the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction
upon [their] execution of sentences.”61 The Court further interpreted the
national shift against executing persons with intellectual disabilities as
evidence “that some characteristics of mental retardation undermine the
strength of the procedural protections that our capital jurisprudence
steadfastly guards.”62 Given the fact that people with intellectual
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 306–07.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. at 317.
Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986)).
Id.

12

UMass Law Review

v. 16 | 2

disabilities “by definition” exhibit adaptive deficits, the Court
determined that “[t]heir deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from
criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.”63
Pursuant to the Court’s reasoning, deterrence and retribution are two
justifications for capital punishment, and according to retributive
principles, “the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily
depends on the culpability of the offender.”64 Because these principles
are only served if less culpable capital defendants, such as those with
intellectual disabilities, are given a sentence less severe than the death
penalty, the Court found “an exclusion [from death] for the mentally
retarded [to be] appropriate.”65 Similarly, regarding deterrence as a
justification for capital punishment, the Court wrote that:
it is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make
[intellectually disabled] defendants less morally culpable—for
example, the diminished ability to understand and process
information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, or to control impulses—that also make it less likely that
they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a
penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that
information.66

For this reason, the Court found that “executing the mentally retarded
[would] not measurably further the goal of deterrence.”67
Finally, the Court recognized an “enhanced” likelihood of people
with intellectual disabilities receiving the death penalty rather than life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) during
sentencing.68 This is largely due to the:
possibility of false confessions, [and] . . . the lesser ability of
mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of
mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more
aggravating factors. Mentally retarded defendants may be less able
to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor
witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted
impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.69

63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 318.
Id. at 319.
Id.
Id. at 320.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 320–21.
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Some jurors may assume that people with intellectual disabilities pose
a greater risk of reoffending in the future and are therefore more
deserving of death.70 In reality, intellectual disability lessens a
defendant’s culpability and supports the argument for LWOP instead of
death.71
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, and framed the issue before the
Court as “whether a national consensus deprives Virginia of the
constitutional power to impose the death penalty on capital murder
defendants” like Atkins.72 Contrary to the majority, Rehnquist did not
acknowledge a national consensus against executing people with
intellectual disabilities.73 Rehnquist argued that, rather than deciding the
case according to stare decisis, the majority sought to justify “a post hoc
rationalization for [its] subjectively preferred result . . . .”74 When
deciding if a punishment is cruel and unusual, Rehnquist asserted that
the Court should only consider “the work product of legislatures and
sentencing jury determinations[.]”75 Therefore, he objected to instances
where the Court relied upon public “opinion poll data”76 and
international opposition to capital punishment.77 According to
Rehnquist, the Court’s reasoning should have been informed by
“comprehensive statistics” on “whether juries routinely consider death
a disproportionate punishment for mentally retarded offenders.”78
Similarly, Rehnquist criticized the Court for relying on opinions
expressed by professional organizations, since those views did not
reflect “the workings of normal democratic processes.”79
Echoing Rehnquist’s reasoning, Justice Scalia began his dissent by
contending that, “[s]eldom has an opinion of this Court rested so
70

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 321 (“As Penry demonstrated, moreover, reliance on mental retardation as
a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that
the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury. 492 U.S.
302, 323–25 (1989). Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special
risk of wrongful execution.”).
Id. at 319–21.
Id. at 321 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 321–22.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 324.
Id.
Id. at 326.
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obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members.”80 He
argued that a punishment is cruel and unusual only if: (1) it violates the
standards that existed when Congress enacted the Bill of Rights; or (2)
it violates contemporary understandings of decency, as primarily
determined by state statutes.81 From Scalia’s perspective, the majority
failed to demonstrate that executing people with intellectual disabilities
violated 18th century standards of decency in the United States.82 He
wrote that the majority “[paid] lipservice” to previous Court decisions
while “miraculously extract[ing] a ‘national consensus’ forbidding
execution of the mentally retarded” from state statutes in eighteen of the
thirty-eight death penalty states.83 Scalia was critical of the majority’s
ruling based on statutes that were “still in [their] infancy.”84 For him,
the majority’s opinion rested on “embarrassingly feeble evidence.”85
Historically, all states permitted the execution of people with
intellectual disabilities. In 1988—14 years prior to Atkins—Georgia
became the first state to prohibit executing citizens who were
intellectually disabled.86 Scalia therefore discounted the majority’s
conclusion that states were trending toward prohibiting the practice,
writing, “in what other direction could we possibly see change?”87
Instead, he felt the Court was “thrashing about for evidence of
‘consensus’ . . . .”88 and argued that the majority relied on a “grab bag
of reasons” to justify its categorical ban against executing defendants
with intellectual disabilities.89 Therefore, he refuted both the majority’s
claim that retribution and deterrence would not be served by executing
such individuals, and its assertion of an increased likelihood of
intellectually disabled defendants receiving a sentence of death rather
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 339–40.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 344.
Id.
Id. (referencing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2017)).
Id.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 352. As a result of their efforts, and for basing the opinion on the consensus
of professional organizations, Scalia awarded the majority the “Prize for the
Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus.’” Id. at 347. Absent
what he considered compelling evidence, Scalia accused the majority of
manufacturing a “contrived consensus.” Id. at 349.
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than LWOP.90 Scalia concluded that tying the definition of intellectual
disabilities to medical diagnostic criteria was problematic because “the
symptoms of this condition can readily be feigned.”91
C. Hall v. Florida (2014)
In Hall v. Florida, the Court addressed whether the definition of
intellectual disability that Florida used in capital cases was
unconstitutional.92 Florida’s statute stipulated that if a defendant scored
above 70 on every IQ test, “all further exploration of intellectual
disabilit[ies] [was] foreclosed.”93 For the majority, Justice Kennedy
noted that Hall “presented substantial and unchallenged evidence of
intellectual disabilit[ies]”94—specifically, he demonstrated several
“deficits in adaptive functioning.”95 Hall’s scores from nine IQ tests,
administered over a forty-year period, were submitted as further proof
of his intellectual disabilities.96 The scores ranged between 60 and 80,
and two results fell below 70.97 The trial court rejected the IQ scores
below 70 for “evidentiary reasons,” leaving Hall with seven IQ scores
ranging from 71 to 80.98 Because Hall’s minimum IQ score of 71
surpassed the statutory floor of 70, Florida law classified him as a person
without intellectual disabilities and eligible for execution.99
At the outset of the opinion, the Court reaffirmed that: (1) “[n]o
legitimate penological purpose is served by executing a person with
intellectual disabilit[ies]”; and (2) “to impose the harshest of
punishments on an intellectually disabled person violates his or her
90
91
92
93

94
95

96
97
98
99

Id. at 351–52.
Id. at 353.
Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014).
Id. (referencing FLA. STAT. § 921.137 (2013) invalidated by Hall v. Florida, 572
U.S. 701 (2014)).
Id. at 705.
Id. at 706 (“[A]n individual’s ability or lack of ability to adapt or adjust to the
requirements of daily life, and success or lack of success in doing so, is central to
the framework followed by psychiatrists and other professionals in diagnosing
intellectual disabilit[ies].”). The Court noted that Hall’s adaptive deficits were
exasperated by a rough home life, where his mother repeatedly subjected him to
physical abuse for displaying symptoms that originated from those adaptive
deficits. Id.
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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inherent dignity as a human being.”100 Moreover, the Court reasoned
that deterrence is not effectuated because “those with intellectual
disability are, by reason of their condition, likely unable to make the
calculated judgments that are the premise for the deterrence
rationale.”101 Similarly, “[t]he diminished capacity of the intellectually
disabled lessens moral culpability and hence the retributive value of the
punishment.”102 The Court highlighted a third reason for prohibiting the
execution of intellectually disabled people: “to protect the integrity of
the trial process.”103 As the Court recognized, those with intellectual
disabilities “are more likely to give false confessions, are often poor
witnesses, and are less able to give meaningful assistance to their
counsel.”104 Accordingly, these individuals “may not . . . receive the
law’s most severe sentence.”105
When deciding Hall, the Court observed that “it is proper to consider
the psychiatric and professional studies that elaborate on the purpose
and meaning of IQ scores . . . .”106 These sources serve as the starting
point of consideration, as the Court “must express its own independent
determination reached in light of the instruction found in those sources
and authorities.”107 To that end, the Court is “informed by the work of
medical experts” when “determining intellectual disabilit[ies].”108
Consequently, when a court is “determining who qualifies as
intellectually disabled, it is proper to consult the medical community’s
opinions.”109 Given that the average IQ test score is 100, a standard
deviation is “approximately 15 points,” and two standard deviations
below the average is considered abnormal, an abnormal score is defined
as “a score of approximately 70 points.”110 According to the Court,
Florida’s statute erred by interpreting IQ scores above 70 as absolute
proof that a defendant was not intellectually disabled.111 In contrast, “the
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 708.
Id. at 709.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 710.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 712.
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medical community” required evaluating defendants for signs of
adaptive deficits even in cases where they “ha[d] an IQ test score above
70.”112
The Court considered Florida’s statute to have “disregard[ed]
established medical practice in two interrelated ways.”113 First, the
statute viewed “an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a
defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would
consider other evidence.”114 Second, “[t]he professionals who design,
administer, and interpret IQ tests [contend] that IQ test scores should be
read not as a single fixed number but as a range.”115 This range, known
as the Standard Error of Measurement (SEM), is “a reflection of the
inherent imprecision of the [IQ] test itself.”116 Proper administration of
IQ testing, therefore, recognizes “that an individual’s score is best
understood as a range of scores on either side of the recorded score.”117
Florida’s statute posed a problem because the evaluators who diagnose
intellectual disabilities in Florida did not “consider factors indicating
whether [a defendant] had deficits in adaptive functioning” after “the
SEM [was] applie[d] and the individual’s IQ score [was] 75 or
below.”118 In its rationale, the Court noted, “every state legislature to
have considered the issue after Atkins—save Virginia’s—and whose
law has been interpreted by its courts has taken a position contrary to
that of Florida.”119 This fact was “strong evidence of consensus that our
society does not regard this strict cutoff [of a score of 70 or lower on an
IQ test in order to qualify as intellectually disabled] as proper or
humane.”120
In one of its most instructive statements, the Court wrote that “Atkins
did not give the States unfettered discretion to define the full scope” of
the prohibition against executing intellectually disabled defendants.121
Referencing then-current medical diagnostic criteria, “[t]he Atkins
Court twice cited definitions of intellectual disability which, by their
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 713.
Id.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 718.
Id.
Id. at 719.
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express terms, rejected a strict IQ test score cutoff at 70.”122
Consequently, “[t]he clinical definitions of intellectual disabilit[ies],
which take into account that IQ scores represent a range, not a fixed
number, were a fundamental premise of Atkins.”123 If this were not the
case, and “the States were to have complete autonomy to define
intellectual disabilit[ies] as they wished, the Court’s decision in Atkins
could become a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of
human dignity would not become a reality.”124
Based on this reasoning, the Court held that Florida’s “rigid
rule . . . create[d] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual
disabilit[ies would] be executed, and thus [was] unconstitutional.”125 In
reaching its holding, the Court “placed substantial reliance on the
expertise of the medical profession.”126 According to the Court, “this
determination [was] informed by the views of medical experts [whose]
views do not dictate the Court’s decision, yet the Court does not
disregard these informed assessments.”127 Thus, “[t]he legal
determination of intellectual disabilit[ies] is distinct from a medical
diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s diagnostic
framework.”128 Within a legal context, this means “when a defendant’s
IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin
of error, the defendant must be [given the opportunity] to present
additional evidence of intellectual disabilit[ies], including testimony
regarding adaptive deficits.”129 The Hall Court asserted that
“[i]ntellectual disability is a condition not a number” and cautioned
against finding “a single factor as dispositive of a conjunctive and
interrelated assessment.”130 The Court asserted “[t]he death penalty is
the gravest sentence our society may impose,” and the Florida statute
was arbitrary in that “Florida seeks to execute a man because he scored
a 71 instead of 70 on an IQ test.”131

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 720–21.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 721.
Id.
Id. at 723.
Id.
Id. at 724.
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Justice Alito dissented, interpreting Atkins as “not mandat[ing] the
use of a single method for identifying” people with intellectual
disabilities.132 Alito accused the majority as now requiring a single
method for assessing intellectual disabilities that was “largely [based]
on the positions adopted by private professional associations.”133 Many
of his objections concerned the distinction between evolving “standards
of American society as a whole” and “evolving standards of
professional societies.”134 Alito believed that Eighth Amendment
considerations hinged on the former, while the majority relied on the
latter to invalidate Florida’s statute.135 He also understood the Atkins
Court to have established a strict three-prong definition of intellectual
disability based on then-current medical diagnostic criteria.136
According to Alito, the failure to meet even one of those criteria, such
as an IQ score at or below 70, should prohibit the state from finding that
a defendant has an intellectual disability regardless of whether they
satisfied the other two prongs.137

132
133

134
135

136
137

Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 725. He argued that this approach was “most unwise” and “likely to result
in confusion.” Id.
Id.
Id. Alito contended that the majority failed to demonstrate a national consensus
among state statutes requiring the use of the SEM for IQ tests. Id. at 728–29.
Instead, Alito thought that “[t]he fairest assessment of the current situation is that
the States have adopted a multitude of approaches to a very difficult question.”
Id. at 730. He elaborated: “[u]nder our modern Eighth Amendment cases, what
counts are our society’s standards—which is to say, the standards of the American
people—not the standards of professional associations, which at best represents
the views of a small professional elite.” Id. at 731.
Id. at 727.
Id. He also dissented because when defendants presented IQ scores above 70 but
at or below 75, the majority did not require additional evidence of the first prong
(as assessed by IQ score), but instead required evidence aimed at the second prong
(adaptive deficits). Id. at 735–36. Alito interpreted this to mean that “even when
a defendant has failed to show that he meets the first prong . . . evidence of the
second prong . . . can establish intellectual disabilit[ies].” Id. at 736. According to
Alito, this approach was flawed because “[s]trong evidence of a deficit in adaptive
behavior does not necessarily demonstrate a deficit in intellectual functioning [the
first prong]. And without the latter, a person simply cannot be classified as
intellectually disabled.” Id. at 737. Furthermore, prioritizing evidence of adaptive
deficits, he warned, would “produce inequities in the administration of capital
punishment” because no two individuals would have the same degree of adaptive
deficits. Id.
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The dissent identified several problems created by the majority’s
approach which require “legislative judgments, not judicial
resolution.”138 First, “because the views of professional associations
often change, tying Eighth Amendment law to these views will lead to
instability and continue to fuel protracted litigation.”139 Second, the
post-Hall landscape will become substantially more difficult to navigate
because the Court is subsequently forced to “follow every new change
in the thinking of these professional organizations or to judge the
validity of each new change.”140 Third, in the event that they disagree,
the Court must now “determine which professional organizations are
entitled to special deference.”141 Fourth, the aspects of intellectual
disabilities that are relevant to the capital punishment context are not the
same as those relevant to non-criminal evaluations.142
In conclusion, Alito asserted that “[t]here are various ways to
account for error in IQ testing” and Florida’s practice of allowing
defendants to submit scores from multiple IQ tests represented one such
acceptable method.143 Levying one last criticism, Alito faulted the
majority for “unjustifiably assum[ing] a blanket (or very common) error
measurement of 5” points on IQ tests.144 By “blindly import[ing] a 5point margin of error” the majority failed to recognize that “every test
has a different SEM.”145
D. Brumfield v. Cain (2015)
Shortly after Hall, the Court in Brumfield v. Cain considered
whether a person on Louisiana’s death row had met the required
threshold to receive a hearing on his alleged intellectual disabilities.146
In this case, the Court recognized that Brumfield presented preliminary
138
139
140
141
142
143
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145
146

Id. at 733.
Id. at 731–32.
Id. at 732.
Id. at 733.
Id.
Id. at 738. Alito opined that Florida did not need to consider the SEM because it
allowed defendants to submit scores from as many IQ tests as they wished. Id. at
733–34. The Court had “been presented with no solid evidence that the
longstanding reliance on multiple IQ test scores as a measure of intellectual
functioning is so unreasonable or outside the ordinary as to be unconstitutional.”
Id. at 735.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 740–41.
Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305 (2015).
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evidence of an intellectual disability, including “an IQ score of 75.”147
However, Louisiana’s trial court denied Brumfield “an evidentiary
hearing [and refused] granting funds” so he could further establish
evidence of his intellectual disability.148 Following Louisiana’s
Supreme Court’s denial to review the trial court’s decision, Brumfield
submitted a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana.149 That court observed that
Brumfield scored 70, 70, 72, and 75 on four separate IQ tests
administered between 1995 and 2009.150 These scores constituted
“unadjusted, full scale scores,” meaning that they did not take the SEM
into account.151 During the highest appeal review, the Supreme Court
similarly highlighted Brumfield’s scores, stating that “the
results . . . when adjusted to account for measurement errors, indicated
that Brumfield had an IQ score between 65 and 70.”152
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor established that the
Court “presume[d] that a rule according an evidentiary hearing only to
those capital defendants who raise a ‘reasonable doubt’ as to their
intellectual disabilit[ies] is consistent with [the Court’s] decision in
Atkins.”153 Nevertheless, the Court criticized Louisiana’s trial court for
interpreting a raw IQ score of 75 as evidence that Brumfield did not
have an intellectual disability. As the Court noted, “an IQ test result
cannot be assessed in a vacuum,” and a raw score of 75 “equate[s] to a
score of 70 or less” when accounting for the SEM.154 Additionally, the
Court considered “the evidence in the state-court record [to provide]
substantial grounds to question Brumfield’s adaptive functioning.”155
Thus, the Court held that the state court erred when it found that
Brumfield did not meet the minimum threshold showing required to
grant an evidentiary hearing on his alleged intellectual disability.156
Furthermore, while “the underlying facts of Brumfield’s crime might
147
148
149
150
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153
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155
156

Id. at 310.
Id.
Id. at 311.
Brumfield v. Cain, 854 F. Supp. 2d 366, 389–90 (M.D. La. 2012) rev’d by
Brumfield v. Cain, 744 F.3d 918 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 389.
Brumfield, 576 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 320.
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arguably provide reason to think that Brumfield possessed certain
adaptive skills,” the Court cited medical standards to demonstrate that
the proper focus is on adaptive deficits, not strengths.157 Finally, the
Court stipulated that “[i]t is critical to remember . . . that in seeking an
evidentiary hearing, Brumfield was not obligated to show that he was
intellectually disabled, or even that he would likely be able to prove as
much.”158 Instead, Brumfield was required to satisfy the burden of proof
necessary to trigger an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Having met this
burden of proof, the Court held that Brumfield was “entitled to a hearing
to show that he so lacked the capacity for self-determination that [the
State, by taking his life,] would violate the Eighth Amendment.”159
Justice Thomas dissented and painstakingly described the facts
surrounding the murder Brumfield committed, since “the majority
devote[d] a single sentence” to the issue.160 He contrasted the
philanthropy of one of the victim’s sons, who played professional
football, with Brumfield’s “ceaseless campaign of review
proceedings.”161 Thomas also contended that the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) precluded federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, from accepting habeas corpus petitions
under most circumstances.162 In his dissent, Thomas appeared to
157
158
159
160
161
162

Id.
Id.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 325 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 332.
Id. at 334. Thomas argued that AEDPA only allowed the Supreme Court to accept
habeas corpus petitions if a State court unreasonably applied a Federal law, as
identified in previous Supreme Court decisions, or issued an unreasonable ruling
given the evidence available to the State court during trial proceedings. Id.
Because Thomas did not think either criteria applied, he did not consider
Brumfield to have the proper standing required to bring his habeas corpus petition
before the Supreme Court. Moreover, Thomas alleged that the Majority opposed
“the state court’s conclusion that Brumfield had not made a sufficient threshold
showing of mental retardation to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
claim,” but this conclusion rested on “the application of law to fact, not on the
determination of the facts themselves.” Id. at 338. In other words, Thomas argued
that the Majority reversed the state court’s decision because it perceived the state
court to have misapplied the law. AEDPA, however, only permitted the Court to
reverse state court decisions if the facts of the case had been improperly decided.
Id. at 342. As a result, Thomas objected because the Majority took “a meritless
state-law claim” and presented “it as two factual determinations” in order to
achieve its desired outcome. Id. According to Thomas, “Atkins . . . did not
imply—let alone hold—that a prisoner is entitled to a hearing on an Atkins claim.”
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entirely disregard the Majority’s stipulation that states must add an SEM
of +5/-5 to raw IQ scores.163 Instead, he found that “the record justified
a finding that Brumfield’s IQ is 75, if not a bit higher.”164 With this
statement, Thomas implied that Brumfield, having scored above 70, was
not intellectually disabled. To support his position, Thomas emphasized
Brumfield’s adaptive strengths and concluded that “[t]he
record . . . supports the state court’s finding that Brumfield is not
impaired in adaptive skills.”165
E. Moore v. Texas I (2017)
In Moore v. Texas I, the Supreme Court considered whether states
could assess intellectual disabilities in a way that ran afoul of current
medical standards or relied on outdated standards. After the Court
decided Atkins, the Texas legislature failed to define intellectual
disabilities or how they should be evaluated in capital cases. Seeking to
fill that void, the Texas CCA provided a definition in its 2004 Ex parte
Briseno decision which was based on medical diagnostic criteria
published in 1992.166 In addition to the medical criteria, the Texas CCA
also introduced the Briseno factors, derived from character traits
displayed by the fictional character Lennie from John Steinback’s novel
Of Mice and Men.167 By the time the Texas CCA delivered its Ex parte
Moore168 ruling, the medical diagnostic criteria that the Briseno court
utilized had been updated with revised standards.169 Nevertheless, the

163
164

165
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168
169

Id. at 344. Finally, Thomas perceived the Court to have “concede[d] that the
record includes evidence supporting [the state] court’s factual findings.” Id. at
349. For this reason, Thomas thought “that concession should bar relief for
Brumfield.” Id.
Id. at 340–41.
Id. at 336 (Brumfield obtained raw IQ scores of 70, 70, 72, and 75 on four separate
tests. Applying an SEM of +5/-5 to these scores would have produced scores of
65, 65, 67, and 70, respectively.).
Id. “Brumfield lived independently before his arrest, often staying with his
pregnant girlfriend and had been able to maintain a job for approximately three
months before quitting . . . .” Id. at 337.
Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). See also Alexander
H. Updegrove et al., Intellectual Disability in Capital Cases: Adjusting State
Statutes After Moore v. Texas, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 527,
535 (2018).
See supra text accompanying note 4.
Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
See Updegrove et al., supra note 166, at 535. See also supra text accompanying
note 45.
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Texas CCA relied upon both the 1992 medical diagnostic criteria and
the Briseno factors to determine that Moore was not intellectually
disabled.170
This set the stage for Justice Ginsburg to write in Moore I that the
Court’s Hall “instruction[s] cannot sensibly be read to give courts leave
to diminish the force of the medical community’s consensus.”171
Additionally, “the several factors Briseno set out as indicators of
intellectual disability are an invention of the CCA untied to any
acknowledged source.”172 Because the Briseno factors were neither
“aligned with the medical community’s information” nor given
“strength from [the Court’s] precedent[s],” the Court held that “they
may not be used . . . to restrict qualification of an individual as
intellectually disabled.”173 The Court summarized testimony on
Moore’s limited intellectual capacity, writing “[a]t 13, Moore lacked
basic understanding of the days of the week, the months of the year, and
the seasons; he could scarcely tell time or comprehend the standards of
measure or the basic principle that subtraction is the reverse of
addition.”174
The Court then identified “the generally accepted, uncontroversial
intellectual-disability diagnostic definition” located in the most recent
version of the AAIDD as the appropriate standard for evaluating capital
defendants for intellectual disabilities.175 The Court observed that the
Texas CCA relied on the Briseno factors without “citation to any
authority, medical or judicial . . . .”176 The Court also felt the Texas
CCA focused on Moore’s adaptive strengths, including “living on the
streets, playing pool and mowing lawns for money, committing the
crime in a sophisticated way and then fleeing, testifying and
representing himself at trial, and developing skills in prison.”177 All of
these perceived strengths influenced the Texas CCA to disregard “the
significance of Moore’s adaptive limitations.”178
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Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1045.
Id.
Id. at 1046.
Id. at 1047.
Id.
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The Moore I Court reaffirmed Hall: “a State cannot refuse to
entertain other evidence of intellectual disability when a defendant has
an IQ score above 70.”179 Furthermore, the Court highlighted that in
Hall their analysis “relied on the most recent (and still current) versions
of the leading diagnostic manuals—the DSM-5 and AAIDD-11[]”—as
the authorities on intellectual disabilities.180 Expanding on its position,
the Court wrote that “Hall indicated that being informed by the medical
community does not demand adherence to everything stated in the latest
medical guide. But neither does our precedent license disregard of
current medical standards.”181 Because “Moore’s score of 74, adjusted
for the standard error of measurement, yield[ed] a range of 69 to 79,”
and “the lower end of Moore’s score range [fell] at or below 70,” the
Texas CCA erred in concluding that Moore could not be intellectually
disabled.182 Such a ruling would be “irreconcilable with Hall.”183 Hall
required state courts to “continue the inquiry and consider other
evidence of intellectual disability where an individual’s IQ score,
adjusted for the test’s standard error, falls within the clinically
established range for intellectual-functioning deficits.”184
Upon review, the Court found the Texas CCA to have
“overemphasized Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths” while “the
medical community [instead] focuses the adaptive-functioning inquiry
on adaptive deficits.”185 Likewise, the CCA erred when it “stressed
Moore’s improved behavior in prison,” since “[c]linicians . . . caution
against reliance on adaptive strengths developed ‘in a controlled
setting,’ as a prison surely is.”186 Moreover, Texas incorrectly suggested
that childhood trauma precludes a finding of intellectual disabilities
when in fact “[c]linicians rely on such factors as cause to explore the
179
180

181
182
183
184
185
186

Id. at 1048.
Id. The Court is referring to the manuals published by the American Psychiatric
Association, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM–5], and the American
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, AM. ASS’N ON
INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY:
DEFINITIONS, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (11th ed. 2010)
[hereinafter AAIDD–11].
Moore I, at 1049.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1050.
Id.
Id. (quoting DSM–5, supra note 180, at 38).
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prospect of intellectual disability further, not to counter the case for a
disability determination.”187 Furthermore, the lower court “departed
from clinical practice by requiring Moore to show that his adaptive
deficits” did not originate from another cause, such as a different
psychological disorder, that would not entitle Moore to execution
relief.188 The Court criticized this tactic because professionals
acknowledge that “many intellectually disabled people also have other
mental or physical impairments.”189 Therefore, the presence of an
additional disorder is not justification for ruling that a person is not
intellectually disabled.190
The Court reasoned that there was an increased likelihood that states
would execute people with intellectual disabilities because “[b]y design
and in operation, the Briseno factors” “advanced lay perceptions of
intellectual disability.”191 This was worrisome because “the medical
profession has endeavored to counter lay stereotypes” of people with
intellectual disabilities, which the Texas practice contradicted.192
Therefore, these lay stereotypes, “much more than medical and clinical
appraisals, should spark skepticism.”193 The Court also highlighted that
even looking within Texas’ own practices “[t]he Briseno factors [were]
an outlier[.]”194 “Texas itself [did] not follow Briseno in contexts other
than the death penalty”.195 Emphasizing this point, the court stressed
that “Texas cannot satisfactorily explain why it applie[d] current
medical standards for diagnosing intellectual disabilit[ies] in other
contexts, yet clings to superseded standards when an individual’s life is
at stake.”196 While Atkins did afford states freedom to define intellectual
disabilities, Hall limited the scope of that freedom.197 Notably, the Court
187
188
189
190
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Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1052.
Id.
Id.
Id. When issuing rulings on questions other than capital punishment, and where
an assessment of the individual’s mental acuity was necessary, Texas courts
would require the assessment be conducted in conformity with the requirements
of current clinical practices.
Id.
Id. at 1052–53.
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established the DSM-5 and the AAIDD-11 as offering an “improved
understanding” over older versions of those same manuals.198
Consequently, “[t]he medical community’s current standards supply
one constraint on States’ leeway in this area.”199 The Court remanded
the case because Texas “failed adequately to inform” its decision with
current medical understandings of intellectual disabilities and instead
insisted on “clinging to the standard it laid out in Briseno, including the
wholly nonclinical Briseno factors[.]”200
Chief Justice Roberts conceded in his dissent that the Briseno factors
were “an unacceptable method” of protecting the intellectually disabled
from execution in light of Atkins, but he did not find that the Texas CCA
“erred as to Moore’s intellectual functioning.”201 His primary objection
was that the majority “abandon[ed] the usual mode of
analysis . . . employed in Eighth Amendment cases.”202 According to
Roberts, “clinicians, not judges, should determine clinical standards;
and judges, not clinicians, should determine the content of the Eighth
Amendment.”203 He claimed the majority “craft[ed] a constitutional
holding based solely on what it deem[ed] to be medical consensus about
intellectual disability,” thereby confusing the roles of clinician and
judge.204
Roberts also considered the lower court to be justified in refusing
“to modify the legal standard it had previously set out[,]” despite the
medical community updating the diagnostic criteria upon which that
standard was based on.205 Roberts argued further that Texas’ ruling did
not contradict Hall. Although calculating Moore’s IQ test score with the
SEM resulted in a range that “placed [him] within the parameters for
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning[,]” the true score “was
unlikely to be in the lower end of the error-generated range because he
was likely exerting poor effort and experiencing depression at the time
the test was administered . . . .”206 For Roberts, Moore scored too high
to meet the first prong for intellectual disability and therefore he “could
198
199
200
201
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Id. at 1053.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1054.
Id.
Id. at 1055.
Id.
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not be found intellectually disabled” at all.207 Furthermore, Roberts
rejected the argument that it was problematic to conclude that Moore’s
adaptive deficits resulted “not from low intellectual abilities, but instead
from outside factors like the trauma and abuse he suffered as a child and
his drug use at a young age.”208
Ultimately, the Chief Justice found that the majority “depart[ed]
from [the] Court’s precedents, followed in Atkins and Hall.”209 He
considered determinations of “cruel and unusual” to hinge on “judicial
judgment about societal standards of decency, not a medical assessment
of clinical practice.”210 Therefore, the majority erred when it ruled
“without any consideration of the state practices” it referenced in
Hall.211 Roberts stated the majority opinion was “based solely on what
the Court views to be departure from typical clinical practice” instead
of focusing on state statutes.212 This approach was problematic because
the purpose of medical diagnostic criteria is not to “describe who is
morally culpable.”213 The Moore I opinion”[was] not compelled by
Hall; it [was] an expansion of it.”214
F. Moore v. Texas II (2019)
After the Moore I Court remanded the case, the Texas CCA once
again determined that Moore was not intellectually disabled.215 The
Court reaffirmed both the DSM-5 and AAIDD-11 definitions of
intellectual disabilities as “valid” and representing “the three underlying
legal criteria” that states must use when evaluating capital defendants
for intellectual disabilities.216 According to the Court, Moore I
established that Moore “had demonstrated sufficient intellectualfunctioning deficits to require consideration of the second criterion—
adaptive functioning.”217 Similarly, the Court observed that, “[w]ith
respect to the third criterion, we found general agreement that any onset
207
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Id. at 1056.
Id.
Id. at 1057–58.
Id. at 1058.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1061.
Ex parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552 at 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Moore II, 139 S. Ct. 666, 668 (2019).
Id.
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took place when Moore was a minor.”218 All that remained, therefore,
was to determine whether Moore displayed adaptive deficits. An answer
in the affirmative would satisfy the diagnostic criteria for intellectual
disability and qualify him for execution relief.
In summary of the Moore I ruling, the Court had “identified at least
five errors” committed by the Texas CCA.219 First, the court cited
Moore’s alleged adaptive strengths to justify disregarding his adaptive
deficits.220 Second, the court cited Moore’s functioning in prison as
evidence of adaptive strengths.221 Next, the Texas court found that
Moore could not have an intellectual disability because his adaptive
deficits were caused by childhood trauma.222 Fourth, the CCA attributed
Moore’s adaptive deficits to a personality disorder instead of intellectual
disability.223 Fifth, and finally, the court relied on the Briseno factors to
conclude that Moore was not intellectually disabled.224 This analysis
was problematic in light of the current medical consensus. 225
In Moore II, the Court reviewed the Texas CCA’s ruling and found
that it could not be reconciled with Moore I because there were “too
many instances in which, with small variations, it repeat[ed] the analysis
[the Court had] previously found wanting, and [those] same parts [were]
critical to its ultimate conclusion.”226 For example, the Texas CCA
“again relied less upon the adaptive deficits . . . than upon Moore’s

218
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Current medical consensus required examining adaptive deficits, not strengths.
Id. at 668–69. Clinicians also cautioned against drawing conclusions about a
person’s adaptive deficits based on how they functioned in highly structured
environments that poorly approximated life in the community at large. Id. at 669.
Furthermore, it is recognized that trauma increases, not decreases, the likelihood
of intellectual disabilities. Current medical practice did not consider the existence
of one psychological disorder to preclude a second diagnosis of intellectual
disabilities since comorbidity is common. Id. Finally, and importantly, the
medical community discredited the Briseno factors, which “had no grounding in
prevailing medical practice” and encouraged basing intellectual disabilities
diagnoses on popular misconceptions. Id.
Id. at 670.
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apparent adaptive strengths.”227 Additionally, the lower court “relied
heavily upon adaptive improvements made [by Moore] in prison.”228
The Court found that “[t]he length and detail of the [CCA’s] discussion
on these points [was] difficult to square with our caution against relying
on prison-based development[s].”229 Furthermore, and in direct contrast
to Moore I, the Texas CCA found Moore intellectually able because he
failed to demonstrate that his adaptive deficits were directly attributable
to intellectual disabilities rather than another psychological disorder.230
Finally, the Court observed that although the Texas CCA’s “opinion
[was] not identical to the opinion [the Court] considered in Moore [I],”
it still contained “sentences here and there suggesting reliance upon”
common misconceptions about intellectual disabilities.231 As a result,
the Court held that the CCA’s ruling
when taken as a whole and when read in the light both of our prior
opinion and the trial court record, rests upon analysis too much of
which too closely resembles what we previously found improper.
And extricating that analysis from the opinion leaves too little that
might warrant reaching a different conclusion than did the trial
court.232

The Court concluded that “Moore has shown he is a person with
intellectual disabilit[ies],” effectively exempting him from execution.233
In dissent, Justice Alito argued that the ruling of the Texas CCA
complied with the court’s precedent because it “adopted the leading
contemporary clinical standards for assessing intellectual disabilit[ies],”

227
228
229
230
231

232
233

Id.
Id. at 671.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 672. The Court arrived at this conclusion based on “the similarity of
language and content between Briseno’s factors and the [CCA’s] statements . . . .”
Id.
Id.
Id. Chief Justice Roberts concurred, acknowledging that, although he could
foresee “difficulties . . . applying Moore [I] in other cases, it [was] easy to see that
the Texas [CCA] misapplied it here.” Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Once again,
the state court “repeated the same errors that [the] Court previously condemned,”
including “improper reliance on the [Briseno] factors” and focusing on “Moore’s
adaptive strengths rather than his deficits.” Id. Roberts noted that the prior
approach “did not pass muster under [the] Court’s analysis last time,” and “still
doesn’t.” Id.
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as required by Moore I.234 Alito accused the majority of engaging in
“factfinding” rather than addressing “a legal error . . . .”235 For the
dissenting Justice, this approach constituted “an unsound departure
from our usual practice,” and stemmed from the Court’s “own failure to
provide a coherent rule of decision in Moore [I].”236
III. STATE COURT CASES CITING EITHER MOORE I OR MOORE II
Following Colorado’s repeal of the death penalty in March 2020,237
the total number of states that retain the death penalty fell to twentyeight.238 Of these twenty-eight states, nine do not have any cases citing
Moore I or Moore II.239 The remaining nineteen states cite to Moore I
or Moore II in forty-five cases, collectively.240 This Section details state
court applications and interpretations of Moore I and Moore II and gives
special attention to the usages which appear suspect given the U.S.
Supreme Court’s direction.
A. Current Medical Standards
Courts from thirteen different states cite Moore I or Moore II to
demonstrate that the Supreme Court of the United States requires states
to use current medical diagnostic criteria when evaluating capital
defendants for intellectual disabilities.241

234
235
236
237

238
239

240

241

Id. at 673 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 674.
Id.
See Neil Vigdor, Colorado Abolishes Death Penalty and Commutes Sentences of
Death
Row
Inmates,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
23,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/colorado-death-penalty-repeal.html
[https://perma.cc/4G4P-LJMS].
See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 8.
See infra Appendix Table I. As of the date of this Article these nine states are:
Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia,
and Wyoming.
See infra Appendix Table 1, which shows that as of the date of this Article
Alabama courts cited Moore I or Moore II in five cases; Arkansas in one; Arizona
in one; California in two; Florida in four; Georgia in one; Nevada in two; North
Carolina in one; Ohio in three; Oregon in one; Pennsylvania in three; South
Carolina in one; Tennessee in one; and Texas in seventeen (excluding Ex parte
Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), which the United States
Supreme Court overturned in Moore II).
See infra Appendix Table 2.
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For example, in Callen v. State, the Alabama Criminal Court of
Appeals (“CCA”) recognized that Moore I criticized the Texas CCA for
having “erroneously applied decades-old standards and fail[ing] to
consider” current medical diagnostic criteria.242 Similarly, in Carroll v.
State, the state court found Moore I to be a direct response to the Texas
CCA, which “ignored prevailing medical standards and applied its own
definition of [intellectual disability] to determine that a death-row
inmate was not exempt from the death penalty under Atkins.”243 The
Alabama court also interpreted Moore I as precluding the use of
definitions of intellectual disabilities “that substantially deviate from
prevailing clinical standards.”244 In Ex parte Carroll the Alabama
Supreme Court stated that Moore I addressed “whether states may
define intellectual disability in a manner that is (1) uninformed by the
medical community or (2) based on outdated medical standards.”245 For
its part, that court understood Moore I to “clearly [require] states to
assess intellectual disabilit[ies] using the most current medical
standards[.]”246
When deciding Ex parte Lane, the Supreme Court of Alabama
referred to Moore I to establish that current medical standards associate
childhood trauma with an increased likelihood of intellectual
disabilities.247 Although the trial court ruled that Lane was not
intellectually disabled, Moore I convinced the prosecution that the trial
court had erred in reaching that conclusion.248 Consequently, “the State
filed a brief acknowledging that the trial court had failed to make
findings regarding the relevant adaptive-skill areas and conceding that
the trial court” did not use the appropriate diagnostic criteria for
intellectual disabilities.249 The court was struck by the unusual
circumstances, observing that, “the State has indicated that it concedes
that the evidence established that Lane is intellectually disabled and that
the trial court simply substituted its own standards for intellectual
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249

Callen v. State, 284 So. 3d 177, 197 n.6 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017).
Carroll v. State (Carroll I), 300 So. 3d 51, 54 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017).
Id. at 55.
Carroll v. State (Carroll II), 300 So. 3d 59, 63 (Ala. 2019).
Id. at 63–64.
Ex parte Lane, 286 So. 3d 61, 66 (Ala. 2018).
Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 68. “[T]he State went further in its concessions, joining Lane in requesting
that [Alabama’s Supreme Court] remand the matter so that the trial court [could]
sentence Lane to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” Id. at 69.
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disabilit[ies] for those accepted by the medical community.”250 Given
the agreement that the wrong standard was used, the court remanded the
case with instructions to commute Lane’s sentence to LWOP.251
The Florida Supreme Court in Glover v. State, found that Moore I
admonished the Texas CCA because it “relied upon superseded medical
standards to conclude that the defendant was not intellectually
disabled.”252 The Florida court argued in a subsequent case that “Moore
[I] does not substantially change the law with regard to consideration of
intelligence or IQ for the purposes of an [intellectual disability]
determination.”253 Instead, Moore I prohibited states from relying on
outdated medical diagnostic criteria.254 As a result, the Florida court
considered itself blameless, because neither the state statutory scheme
“nor this Court’s interpretation of the statute [had] been superseded by
medical standards.”255 The court observed that Moore I explained how
Texas “also erred by concluding that the defendant’s academic failures
and childhood abuse detracted from an adaptive deficit
finding . . . [when] medical experts would consider those ‘risk factors’
for [intellectual disability] rather than a basis to counter an [intellectual
disability] determination.”256
In State v. Thurber, the Supreme Court of Kansas summarized
Moore I to mean that: “states cannot restrict an individual’s qualification
as intellectually disabled by using outdated medical standards; these
adjudications should be informed by the medical community’s current
250
251
252

253
254
255
256

Id.
Id.
Glover v. State, 226 So. 3d 795, 811 n.13 (Fla. 2017). See also Wright v. State,
256 So. 3d 766, 770 (Fla. 2018) (When deciding In re Lewis, the California
Supreme Court understood Moore I to stipulate that “the determination [of
intellectual disability] must be an individualized one, informed by the views of
medical experts.”).
Wright v. State, 256 So. 3d 766, 770 (Fla. 2018).
Id. at 774.
Id. at 775.
Id. (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051 (2017)). Justice Pariente concurred
with the result, but felt it bore mentioning that “the two medical diagnostic
standards relied on in Moore [I] [were] the DSM and the AAIDD, current
editions.” Id. at 780 n.13 (Pariente, J., concurring). Interestingly, and to Justice
Pariente’s point, Georgia’s Court of Appeals has interpreted Moore I as requiring
adherence to a definition of intellectual disabilities that, for all intents and
purposes, appeared consistent with the definition listed in the DSM–5 and
AAIDD–11, although the court neglected to reference either manual by name.
Cawthon v. State, 830 S.E.2d 270, 275 n.18 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
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consensus reflecting its improved understanding over time.”257 Simply
put, Moore I rejected the use of “outdated” and “archaic” diagnostic
criteria.”258 The Kansas court found “significance in [Moore I’s]
holding that current medical standards would further restrict a state’s
discretion in defining intellectual disabilit[ies] for purposes of enforcing
the Eighth Amendment categorical prohibition on executing the
intellectually disabled.”259 In light of the endorsement of current
medical criteria, the Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the state statute
governing the evaluation of intellectual disabilities among capital
defendants.260 Specifically, “since the medical community does not treat
capacity to appreciate the criminality of one’s conduct or to conform
one’s conduct to the requirements of law as conclusively demonstrating
the absence of an intellectual disability, Kansas cannot statutorily
require courts to disregard other relevant medical standards.”261
Satisfied with its interpretation of the statute’s requirements, the
court went on to elaborate how Moore I “recognize[d] in the death
penalty context that states are constrained at least to some extent by the
clinical definition of intellectual disabilit[ies] used in the medical
community, i.e., states must be informed by—and cannot disregard—
current medical community standards on this subject.”262 Because
current medical standards identified three separate criteria that patients
257
258
259
260

261
262

State v. Thurber, 420 P.3d 389, 402 (Kan. 2018).
Id. at 447.
Id.
The statute defined intellectual disabilities in capital cases as “having significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning . . . to an extent which substantially
impairs one’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of one’s conduct or to
conform one’s conduct to the requirements of law.” KAN. STAT. ANN., § 216622(h) (2016). The statute was “further suspect . . . because it applie[d] to death
penalty defendants, but not to noncriminal individuals when making intellectual
disability determinations for noncriminal purposes.” Thurber, 420 P.3d at 450.
The court could not “discern how this incapacity limitation safeguards Kansans’
Eighth Amendment rights, and the State provide[d] no justification for applying
a different standard in the death penalty context.” Id. Consequently, and consistent
with this reasoning, the court removed the problematic condition from the statute
by deleting the phrase “to an extent which substantially impairs one’s capacity to
appreciate the criminality of one’s conduct or to conform one’s conduct to the
requirements of law.” Id. at 451. The statute now defines intellectual disabilities
within the capital context as “having significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning, as defined by K.S.A. 76-12b01, and amendments thereto.” Id.
Thurber, 420 P.3d at 450.
Id. at 452.
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must meet, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the state must evaluate
intellectual disabilities in accordance with those three prongs.263
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Woodall v. Commonwealth,
considered Moore I to contain “better, but not much clearer, guidance
as to how courts should evaluate” capital defendants for intellectual
disabilities.264 Despite finding the Moore I court to have “not provided
crystal-clear guidance,” the Kentucky court nevertheless judged as
“clear” the fact that “prevailing medical standards should be the basis
for a determination as to a defendant’s intellectual disability to preclude
the imposition of the death penalty.”265 In Carr v. State, the Mississippi
Supreme Court held a similar view, pronouncing that “Moore I
reiterated Atkins and did not alter the Atkins landscape,” although, the
court did note that Moore I required some deference to medical
standards.266
In Johnson v. State, the Missouri Supreme Court reviewed a case
where “uncontested evidence showed [that Johnson’s] IQ was between
53 and 63, which uncontestably put him in the category of those
considered intellectually disabled by clinicians.”267 Unfortunately, the
defendant’s attorney never informed him that he satisfied the criteria for
intellectual disabilities and could be ineligible for execution.268
Deprived of this “critical additional information,” Johnson entered a
guilty plea to ensure that he would not receive a sentence of death.269
On appeal, Johnson argued a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel,
which the Missouri Supreme Court disagreed with.270 Additionally:
[b]ecause the trier of fact never adjudicated Johnson to be
intellectually disabled . . . . not only was Johnson’s counsel correct
to advise him he could receive the death penalty if he took his case
to trial, but Johnson’s counsel also had a duty to so inform him
because he was not categorically ineligible to receive the death
penalty.271

263
264
265
266
267
268

269
270
271

Id.
Woodall v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2018).
Id. at 4–5.
Carr v. State, 2017-CA-01481-SCT, ⁋ 16 (Miss. 2019).
Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Mo. 2019) (en banc) (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 924 (provided that the jury believed the evidence and found Johnson
intellectually disabled).
Id. at 908.
Id. at 905 (majority opinion).
Id. at 903.
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The Missouri Supreme Court reasoned that “no amount of additional
investigation [from Johnson’s counsel] would have changed the fact that
Johnson had not yet been adjudicated as intellectually disabled.”272 This
led the court to conclude that “[i]f Johnson’s ultimate reason for
pleading guilty was to avoid receiving the death penalty, as he testified
it was, then any additional investigation and advice from counsel
regarding his eligibility for the death penalty would not have affected
his decision to accept the State’s offer and plead guilty.”273 Accordingly,
“[a]ccepting the State’s plea offer . . . was the only way for Johnson to
definitively ensure he would not receive the death penalty.”274
Confusingly, the Missouri Supreme Court simultaneously conceded
that “Johnson introduced evidence establishing he had an IQ of 63” and
held that “it was not clear error to find Johnson was competent to enter
a guilty plea.”275 This decision is hard to square with Atkins, which
exempted everyone with intellectual disabilities from execution
precisely because their “impairments can jeopardize the reliability and
fairness of capital proceedings against” them.276 The majority charged
the criticism in the dissent as being “misplaced” for relying on Moore I
and Moore II, because “there has never been a finding at any stage in
this case as to whether Johnson is—or is not—intellectually
disabled.”277 Accordingly, while the court agreed that Moore I and
Moore II represented the most recent precedent on intellectual
disabilities in capital cases, it declined to hold that those cases had any
bearing on whether Johnson received ineffective assistance of counsel
or was competent to enter a guilty plea.278
Unlike the majority, the dissent deemed Moore I and Moore II as
compelling the states to define intellectual disabilities in a manner
consistent with the DSM–5 and AAIDD–11.279 Moreover, Justice Stith
272
273
274
275
276
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278
279

Id.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 904.
Id.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306–07 (2002). For an in-depth discussion of
Atkins, see supra Part II.
See Johnson v. State, 580 S.W. 3d 895, 913 (Mo. 2019) (Stith, J., dissenting). The
Missouri Supreme Court alleged that the dissent improperly “divert[ed] attention
from the issues actually presented by this case.” Id. at 906 n.9.
Id. at 907–08.
Id. at 916. The dissent interpreted the Moore cases to mean:
Atkins, as clarified by Hall, Moore I, and Moore II, set out clearly
how states are limited by clinical guidance in determining
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found the Moore cases to specifically require clinicians to assess capital
defendants for adaptive deficits.280 Honing in on the asserted ineffective
assistance of counsel theory, the dissent highlighted that:
[d]espite having no familiarity with the definition of intellectual
disability, and despite testifying that he has no relevant medical or
clinical experience, [Johnson’s counsel] testified he did not believe
Mr. Johnson was intellectually disabled. Counsel’s first grave error,
therefore, was totally failing to familiarize himself with the legal
standard of who is eligible to be executed before giving Mr. Johnson
advice about how to avoid execution.281

280
281

intellectual disabilit[ies]. To determine whether there is evidence of
low intellectual functioning, clinicians give multiple IQ scores and
account for a standard error of measurement (five points) when an
IQ score is close to, but above 70. Then, to determine whether this
low IQ is accompanied by adaptive behavior deficits, clinicians,
preferably using standardized instruments, should examine records
from childhood and interview those who knew the defendant,
looking only at whether the defendant, when in a non-penal
environment, exhibited deficits in conceptual, social, or practice
skills. Finally, some evidence of the deficits should be available
before age 18.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 920. The dissenting Justice highlighted the following exchange between the
court and Johnson’s counsel:
Q. Are you familiar with Atkins vs. Virginia?
A. Vaguely.
Q. Do you know the whole Atkins vs. Virginia?
A. Not offhand.
Q. Are you familiar with Hall vs. Florida?
A. No.
Q. Is someone who suffers from mental retardation eligible for the death
penalty?
A. I do not believe so.
Q. Did you discuss this with Mr. Johnson?
A. I did not believe that Mr. Johnson was found to be mentally—have
mental retardation. Close to it, but not mental retardation.
Q. What is the definition of mental retardation?
A. I’m not a doctor. I don’t know. I just know that in my—my relationship
with Mr. Johnson and in speaking with him, that I did not believe that he
suffered from mental retardation.
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In conjunction with other evidence, this neglect supported a conclusion
that “[c]ounsel’s deficient performance stemmed from his
incompetence in failing to familiarize himself with relevant law
surrounding the eligibility for the death penalty and his inability to
recognize the difference between competency and intellectual
disability.”282 When reviewing the full extent of the attorney’s
shortcomings, Justice Stith felt that Johnson had satisfactorily “shown
[that] his defense counsel’s performance was far outside the degree of
skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney given
counsel’s complete failure to inform Mr. Johnson of a possible defense
to the death penalty.”283
In State v. Vela, the defendant made a similar argument before the
Nebraska Supreme Court, stating “that his counsel’s performance was
deficient because counsel failed to adequately present” evidence of his
intellectual disabilities.284 The trial court applied an SEM of +5/-5 to
Vela’s raw IQ test score of 75, as required by Hall, and ruled that he
met the first prong for finding intellectual disability.285 Having satisfied
the first criteria, the trial court proceeded to focus on whether Vela
possessed any adaptive deficits, also keeping in line with Hall. As part
of this adaptive functioning evaluation, the state-appointed expert
requested access to Vela, which Vela’s counsel denied.286 Unable to
visit Vela, the state expert conducted his assessment based on other
available information, and ultimately testified that Vela was not
intellectually disabled.287 Informed by “testing done by several experts,

282
283
284
285
286
287

Q. Are you familiar with the standards that have been used by the U.S.
Courts?
A. I don’t know what—I don’t understand the question.
Q. What standard of the definition of mental retardation was used?
A. I don’t know. If you provide me with it, I could tell you.
Q. Did you know at the time?
A. I did not believe he was mentally retarded.
Q. But you did not know what the definition was?
A. It was—just never even occurred to me to look.
Id. at 919–20.
Id. at 928.
Id.
State v. Vela, 900 N.W.2d 8, 20 (Neb. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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including those retained at Vela’s request and those retained at the
State’s request,” the trial court found that Vela failed to provide
evidence of adaptive deficits.288
The Nebraska Supreme Court saw no issue with Vela’s counsel in
2010, since the state-appointed expert “was able to use alternative
means to evaluate Vela’s adaptive behavior.”289 Testimony from the
state expert in 2010 revealed that, “while Vela had limitations in certain
adaptive skill areas, his overall adaptive behavior was appropriate for
his age.”290 Without access to Vela, however, the state expert had to
formulate his opinion based on “two third-party informants who were
acquainted with Vela for 2 to 3 months prior to his arrest.”291 The
defense-appointed expert also assessed Vela for adaptive deficits using
“Vela’s older sister” as the third-party source of information.292 The
expert for the defense concluded that “Vela had significant impairment
in the adaptive behavior areas of communication, home living,
social/interpersonal skills, self-direction, and functional academic
skills.”293 When justifying the decision to afford greater weight to the
state’s expert, the Nebraska Supreme Court explained that, “[t]he State
presented evidence of Vela’s ability to adapt to procedures and
conditions within the prison system,” which suggests that the court
interpreted this testimony as additional evidence that Vela had no
adaptive deficits.294 Both Vela’s father and sister provided the trial court
with extensive evidence that he was intellectually disabled.295
Nonetheless, the Madison County District Court “found that the
evidence did not establish at least two significant limitations in adaptive
behavior,” and therefore “Vela was not a person with mental
retardation.”296
In its 2010 opinion, the Nebraska Supreme Court observed that the
state expert “met with Vela and Vela’s attorneys on two occasions[,]”
both of which ended in Vela’s counsel denying the expert’s “request to

288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296

Id.
Id. at 21.
State v. Vela, 777 N.W.2d 266, 299 (Neb. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 295.
Id.
Id. at 299.
See infra pp. 42–43 and note 312.
Vela, 777 N.W.2d at 299.
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administer a test designed to measure adaptive behavior.”297 When
reviewing the case again in 2017, the same court considered the lack of
access to Vela irrelevant since “even if Vela’s allegation that his counsel
prevented [the expert] from performing adaptive testing on Vela is true,
such action by counsel did not prejudice Vela, because [the expert] was
able to use alternative means to evaluate Vela’s adaptive
behavior[.]”298Despite recognizing that Moore I criticized the Texas
CCA for relying “on superseded medical standards” this court reasoned
that:
Vela challenged the effectiveness of counsel based on his allegation
that counsel completely prevented an evaluation of his adaptive
functioning. Vela did not challenge the appropriateness of specific
standards or methods that were used to evaluate his adaptive
functioning, and therefore, consideration of that question is not
before us in this appeal.299

The decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court is notable for
several reasons. First, the court ruled that Vela’s counsel’s denial of
state expert testing “did not prejudice Vela[.]”300 Yet denial restricted
the expert’s evaluation of his adaptive functioning to information
gleaned from “third-party informants “301 Contrary to the court’s claim,
Moore I is undeniably relevant here because on review, a court cannot
“diminish the force of the medical community’s consensus” when
evaluating capital defendants for intellectual disabilities.302 The
consensus amongst clinicians reveals that, “[t]he most common
approach to assessment of adaptive skills [in the capital context] has
been the administration of a standardized adaptive behavior scale with
information provided by a person who knows the individual well.”303

297
298
299
300
301
302
303

Id. at 297.
See Vela, 900 N.W.2d at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20 (quoting Vela, 777 N.W.2d at 299).
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017).
Caroline Everington & J. Gregory Olley, Implications of Atkins v. Virginia:
Issues in Defining and Diagnosing Mental Retardation, 8 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL.
PRAC. 1, 8 (2008).
The most fundamental difference between IQ tests and adaptive
behavior scales is that IQ instruments are administered directly to
the person whose intellectual functioning is being evaluated. By
contrast, adaptive behavior scales most frequently involve obtaining

2021

Modern Application of Moore v. Texas

41

While both the state and defense experts completed a standardized
instrument based on third-party testimony, “[t]he choice of informants
is critical for accurate assessment. [Specifically, t]he informant must
have had the opportunity to observe the defendant perform a variety of
tasks in community settings over a period of time.”304 For this reason,
informants are often “family members, teachers, employers, neighbors,
and friends.”305 Current medical standards, therefore, would appear to
require affording greater weight to the defense expert’s testimony
compared to that of the state expert.
The medical community recognizes that not all third parties are
equally qualified to serve as informants, and the identity of the
informant directly influences the accuracy of the assessment. When
determining which expert’s testimony is more credible, the relationship
between the individual interviewed and the individual being evaluated
matters greatly. In Vela, the exact nature of the relationship between
Vela and the informants used by the state expert is unclear, but the
phrase “acquainted with Vela for 2 to 3 months” does not suggest a
close, personal relationship.306 This is concerning because the
informants might not have known Vela well enough for the state expert
to gather an accurate understanding of Vela’s adaptive deficits. For
example, the defense expert interviewed Vela’s older sister, who knew
Vela since birth and constituted an unmistakably appropriate informant.
Moreover, current medical standards recognize that “[i]nformation from
adaptive skill assessments should be supplemented with additional
direct measures of client functioning.”307 By refusing to allow the state
expert access to Vela, his counsel, albeit unknowingly, forced the expert

304
305
306
307

information from other individuals who know or have known the
person and who have observed his functioning in everyday life.
James W. Ellis, Caroline Everington & Ann M. Delpha, Evaluating Intellectual
Disability: Clinical Assessment in Atkins Cases, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1376
(2018); Gilbert S. Macvaugh II & Mark D. Cunningham, Atkins v. Virginia:
Implications and Recommendations for Forensic Practice, 37 J. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 131, 168 (2009) (“[I]nformation regarding adaptive function is most reliably
obtained through the descriptions of third parties who have had the opportunity to
closely observe the examinee in the community. The individual under evaluation
is not the most reliable source of information regarding his own adaptive
functioning.”).
Everington & Olley, supra note 303, at 13.
Id.
Vela, 777 N.W.2d at 299.
Everington & Olley, supra note 303, at 13.
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to rely on “alternative means” which the Nebraska Supreme Court
deemed adequate to determine Vela’s adaptive deficits, but nevertheless
likely violated the standard set out in Moore I.308
Second, the decision in Vela is notable because when “[t]he State
presented evidence of Vela’s ability to adapt to procedures and
conditions within the prison system” the court took that as evidence that
he did not possess adaptive deficits.309 In Moore I, however, the
Supreme Court admonished the court for using evidence of adaptive
deficits displayed in prison as evidence against intellectual
disabilities.310 Interestingly, in the face of such precedent, the Nebraska
Supreme Court neglected to mention that Moore I forbid both
prioritizing defendants’ functioning while in prison and citing adaptive
strengths to justify disregarding adaptive deficits.
Finally, there are portions of testimony delivered by Vela’s father
and sister which shared striking similarities to evidence that the Moore
I Court found compelling in conducting an adaptive deficit
determination, including the defendants’ inability to tell time.311 The
Nebraska Supreme Court reproduced the following account of the
testimony from Vela’s father and sister:
Vela needed assistance bathing until he was approximately 10 years
old. He needed help dressing until after age 12, and was older than
12 before he could tie his own shoes. He learned to ride a bike at age
10, and he never learned to tell time. Vela never learned to drive a
car, never had a checking or savings account, and never learned to
budget money. As a teenager, he could not buy his own clothes or
food, and had no chores in the household because he was incapable
of performing them.312

Given that the Moore I Court highlighted the “significant mental and
social difficulties”313 described by the trial court record, which the
Moore II Court subsequently relied upon to affirm the adaptive deficit

308
309
310
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State v. Vela, 900 N.W.2d 8, 21 (Neb. 2017).
Vela, 777 N.W.2d at 299.
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017).
Compare Vela, 777 N.W.2d at 298 (“he never learned to tell time”), with Moore
I, 137 S. Ct. at 1045 (“he could scarcely tell time”).
Vela, 777 N.W.2d at 298. See supra text accompanying note 174 to compare the
summary of Moore’s adaptive deficits.
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1045.
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determination,314 the Nebraska Supreme Court appears to have erred by
ruling that Vela did not possess the requisite adaptive deficits.315
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Cox, Moore I signified that “the Briseno factors impermissibly
substitute a political consensus on who should be exempt from the death
penalty for objective medical standards.”316 The court also interpreted
Moore I to require adherence to current medical standards, and noted
that Moore I “disapproved of the Texas court’s conclusion that Moore’s
traumatic childhood contraindicated a finding of [intellectual] disability
when . . . clinicians identify traumatic experiences as a risk factor for
intellectual disability.”317 While conducting its review on appeal, the
court emphasized the unusual development that had taken place in the
case before it.
[T]he Commonwealth states it has changed its position on
Appellant’s Atkins claim in light of recent United States Supreme
Court precedent. The Commonwealth notes that the [PostConviction Relief Act (PCRA)] court’s written opinion borrows
significantly from its post-hearing legal memorandum, including the
Commonwealth’s urging of consideration of the Briseno factors,
notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court decision in Moore
[I] several months earlier.318

Additionally, the Commonwealth “highlight[ed] the similarities
between the facts and expert opinion evidence in this case with facts and
expert opinion evidence in Moore [I].”319 It “concede[d] that the PCRA

314
315

316

317
318

319

Moore II, 139 S. Ct. at 672.
Other jurisdictions would agree. In an unpublished disposition, Nevada’s
Supreme Court considered whether “Hall invalidates this court’s prior decision
that [capital defendant] had not met the requirements for [exclusion from
execution] because his intellectual disabilities presented after the developmental
period (birth to 18 years of age).”Mulder v. State, 422 P.3d 1231, at *4 (Nev. July
26, 2018) (unpublished table decision). The court responded in the negative,
relying on the Moore I Court’s endorsement of a three-prong definition of
intellectual disabilities, of which the age of onset requirement was the third prong
and “a core element” of the diagnostic criteria. Id.
Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 378 (Pa. 2019) (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct.
at 1051).
Id. (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1051).
Id. at 386. An “Atkins claim” involves a capital defendant alleging that they have
intellectual disabilities and are therefore ineligible for execution.
Id. at 386–87. “[T]he adaptive strengths focused on by the PCRA court are
comparable to those focused on by the court in Moore . . . .” Id. at 387.
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court’s reliance on the Briseno factors compels reversal.”320 Due to the
ruling in Moore I, the Commonwealth changed its position and “now
contends Appellant met his burden in this case, and urges [the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court] to grant Atkins relief.”321
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appeared sympathetic
toward the prosecution’s request, it nevertheless explained “that
confessions of error by the Commonwealth are not binding on a
reviewing court but may be considered for their persuasive value.”322
The court then identified that “the chief import of [Moore I was] the
central role of the societal consensus to rely on medical and professional
expertise in defining and diagnosing intellectual disabilit[ies].”323
Moore I, the court said, criticized Texas because its “law and
practices . . . deviated from that central principle by engrafting arbitrary
or extraneous considerations into the analysis.”324 Further, in Moore I,
the Court “particularly disapproved [sic] reliance on the Briseno factors
as an attempt to impose a consensus of the citizenry about who should
be eligible for the death sentence rather than criteria accepted in the
professional and medical community.”325Ultimately, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth’s position, holding that
the PCRA court improperly “relied on the Briseno factors.”326 Although
the court found that “the PCRA court made [its] findings and
determinations, in part, on improper considerations,” the case was
remanded because the court could not “conclude what credibility and
factual determinations the PCRA court would have found, applying a
correct Atkins analysis.”327
In State v. Blackwell, the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld
the trial court’s ruling that Blackwell was not intellectually disabled
“[b]ecause the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony[.]”328 The court
reached this conclusion despite admitting that “it is concerning that
Blackwell, at 54 years old, scored 63 and 68 on the I.Q. tests given in
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328

Id. at 387.
Id.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 146–49 (Pa. 2018)).
Id.
Id. at 388.
Id. (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1053).
Id.
Id. at 388–89.
State v. Blackwell, 801 S.E.2d 713, 720 (S.C. 2017).
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preparation of the Atkins hearing.”329 The trial court denied that
Blackwell possessed adaptive deficits even while “acknowledg[ing]
evidence that Blackwell had difficulty living independently after the
dissolution of his marriage[.]”330 Although unsettling, the trial court did
not “find this [difficulty adapting] translated into deficits in Blackwell’s
adaptive behavior.”331 Instead, the lower court underscored Blackwell’s
adaptive strengths and offered alternate explanations for why he
struggled, including depression.332 On appeal, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina determined that “Blackwell ha[d] not shown the trial
court committed an error of law or that its decision [was] unsupported
by the evidence[.]”333 In a footnote, the court explained that it did not
consider the trial court to have erred, even though the decision preceded
Moore I, because “the court’s analysis comports with [Moore I].”334 The
court asserted that Moore I prohibited reliance on outdated medical
standards and the Briseno factors, which were created without reference
to any authority.335 Accordingly, Moore I did not compel a reversal of
the decision before the Supreme Court of South Carolina because the
trial court’s ruling did not rest on either of those two prohibitions.
Battaglia v. State asked the Texas CCA to consider whether the trial
court properly determined that Battaglia was competent for
execution.336 Traditionally, competency for execution has been treated
as a separate legal matter from intellectual disabilities.337 Accordingly,

329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337

Id. at 721.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 721–22.
Id. at 721 n.11.
Id.
Battaglia v. State, 537 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
The issue of competency for execution focuses on how a capital defendant is
functioning in “the present moment” when “execution is imminent.” Ellis,
Everington & Delpha, supra note 303, at 1388 & n.322. Given the often long wait
times on death row from conviction to execution, many capital defendants
develop symptoms while on death row that raise questions of their competency
for execution. Id. at 1334 n.127.
By contrast, intellectual disability is a condition manifested either at
birth or during childhood (most frequently early in childhood), and
which essentially remains throughout the individual’s life. As a
result, the mental illness concerns about substantial changes or
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the Texas CCA did not cite Moore I in the majority opinion. The dissent,
however, asserted that Moore I established the need for states to rely on
current medical standards when conducting evaluations of any kind
within the capital context.338 As a result, the dissent advocated “to the
extent that a competency determination requires an assessment of
whether a defendant is suffering from a severe mental illness, it is
appropriate to consider the current medical framework in making such
a determination.”339
In 2018, the Texas CCA issued an unpublished opinion, Ex parte
Cathey, observing that Moore I “rejected the use of the Briseno factors
to analyze adaptive deficits[.]”340 Given that Moore I expounded upon
previous precedents in this manner, the Texas CCA “exercise[d] [their]
authority to reconsider this case on [their] own initiative.”341
Subsequently, the court wrote:
This cause is remanded to the habeas court to consider all of the
evidence in light of the Moore v. Texas [I] opinion and make a new
recommendation to this Court on the issue of intellectual
disabilit[ies]. If the habeas court deems it necessary, then it may
receive evidence from mental health experts and any witnesses
whose evidence the court determines is germane to the question of
intellectual disabilit[ies]. The habeas court shall then make findings
of fact and conclusions of law regarding the issue of intellectual
disabilit[ies].342

Several other unpublished opinions from the Texas CCA echo this
ruling almost word for word.343 Additional unpublished cases decided

338
339
340

341
342
343

fluctuations in mental state over time do not have a direct analogue
regarding intellectual disability.
Id. at 1389 (footnote omitted). Additionally, issues of intellectual disability are
usually raised at trial, while issues of competency for execution are typically
raised on appeal once an execution date has been announced. Id. at 1388 n.322.
Battaglia, 537 S.W.3d at 103 (Alcala, J., dissenting).
Id.
Ex parte Cathey, WR-55,161-02, 2018 WL 5817199, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov.
7, 2018) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. at *2.
See Ex parte Henderson, WR-37,658-03, 2018 WL 4762755 (Tex. Crim. App.
Oct. 3, 2018) (per curiam); Ex parte Lizcano, NO. WR-68,348-03, 2018 WL
2717035 (Tex. Crim. App. Jun. 6, 2018) (per curiam); Ex parte Davis, NO. WR40,339-09, 2017 WL 6031852 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2017) (per curiam)
(Newell, J., not participating).
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by the Texas CCA contain similar phrasing but the CCA ordered the
relevant court to hold “a live hearing.”344
In its unpublished Petetan v. State decision, also from 2017, the
Texas CCA noted that Moore I detailed how “this Court’s failure to
consider current medical standards and reliance on Briseno failed to
comply with the Eighth Amendment and Supreme Court precedents.”345
These errors, the Texas CCA ruled, warranted “grant[ing] rehearing” of
the case.346 Justice Newell concurred, agreeing that Moore I “clearly
invalidate[d] portions of our Briseno standard,” while also recognizing
that “Moore [I] appears to [have gone] further than that[.]”347Justice
Keller dissented and did not perceive Moore I to have any bearing on
Petetan’s case, despite the opinion appearing after the Texas CCA’s
ruling in the case in March of 2017.348 Keller adopted this view because
the court “made a point of saying that appellant’s mental retardation
claim would fail even without considering the Briseno factors.”349
Keller reduced Moore I’s significance to a simple rejection of the
Briseno factors, whereas Newell recognized that the case held broader
implications, showcasing the Justices’ divergent interpretations of
Moore I.
In Ex parte Sosa, the Texas CCA acknowledged that Moore I “held
that the Briseno factors, based upon superseded medical standards,
create an unacceptable risk that a person with intellectual disabilities
will be executed in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”350 The Texas
CCA “determine[d] that the trial court’s findings [were] supported by
the record,” and Sosa was intellectually disabled.351 Thus, the Texas
CCA pronounced that “[r]elief is granted on Applicant’s intellectual

344

345

346
347
348
349
350

351

See Ex parte Guevara, NO. WR-63,926-03, 2018 WL 2717041 (Tex. Crim. App.
Jun. 6, 2018) (per curiam); Ex parte Williams, NO. WR-71,296-03, 2018 WL
2717039 (Tex. Crim. App. Jun. 5, 2018) (per curiam); Ex parte Jean, NO. WR84,327-01, 2017 WL 2859012 (Tex. Crim. App. Jun. 28, 2017) (per curiam)
(Newell, J., not participating).
Petetan v. State, NO. AP-77,038, 2017 WL 4678670, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct.
18, 2017) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. (Newell, J., concurring).
Id. at *2 (Keller, J., dissenting).
Id.
Ex parte Sosa, NO. AP-76,674, 2017 WL 2131776, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May
3, 2017) (per curiam) (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017)).
Id.
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disability claim. Applicant’s sentence is reformed to a term of life
imprisonment.”352
In its 2018 Ex parte Wood decision, the Texas CCA concluded that
Wood was “not entitled to relief” despite the fact that many of the
habeas court’s findings hinged on “the Briseno factors and possible
alternate causes of any adaptive deficits,” which the Texas CCA
conceded “[were] no longer viable after the Moore cases.”353 Perhaps
sensing its decision’s strained credibility, even for a judiciary as
notoriously insubordinate as the Texas CCA,354 the court rationalized
that, “[t]he Moore decisions changed the legal analysis for reviewing
intellectual-disability claims in Texas, but Applicant’s evidence relating
to intellectual disability is already in the record.”355 Consequently, the
court denied Wood “the opportunity to further develop the
evidence[.]”356 Justice Newell concurred, and interpreted Moore I as
“rejecting our reliance upon the infamous ‘Briseno factors’” in favor of
“current diagnostic standards.”357 He perceived the Moore I opinion to
be problematic, however, because:
to the extent that Applicant can build a claim of intellectual
disability upon the shifting sands of clinical psychological standards
detailed in Moore [I], this case demonstrates that the determination

352
353
354

355
356
357

Id.
Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
See Michael Hall, And Justice for Some, TEX. MONTHLY (Nov. 2004),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/and-justice-for-some/
[https://perma.cc/WP5P-6ZKJ].
[T]ime and again over the past decade, whenever [Texas CCA]
judges have had a choice between tolerating bad behavior by
prosecutors and police or enforcing the due process rights of
criminals, they have sided with the state. For some judges it has been
a conscious choice, a turning away from the court’s previous
technicality-based, defense-oriented decisions. For others it has
been merely a reflection of their prosecutorial backgrounds. For all,
it is politics: The judges on the CCA are elected politicians and are
careful to paint themselves as tough on crime and criminals,
whatever the cost. And so they have developed an overriding
concern with preventing further hearings, appeals, and new
trials . . . . [O]ver and over before the CCA, finality has trumped
everything else, especially fairness.
Id.
Wood, 568 S.W.3d at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 685, 686 (Newell, J., concurring).
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of intellectual disability has become untethered from the original
rationale for the exception to the imposition of the death penalty
announced in Atkins. Applicant is not intellectually disabled. He is
a serial killer.358

Justice Alcala dissented, insisting that Wood’s “intellectual
disability claim . . . must be reconsidered in light” of Moore I because
it “failed to conform with the diagnostic framework endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Moore [I][.]”359 Alcala also alleged that the “Court’s
majority opinion employs the same type of incorrect intellectual
disability analysis that it has been conducting mistakenly for over a
decade since issuing its opinion in Ex parte Briseno.”360 Expounding
further, Alcala declared “[t]he instant majority opinion continues to
selectively focus on only the IQ scores and adaptive strengths that would
support a determination that applicant is not intellectually disabled,
despite current medical standards suggesting that this is an inappropriate
approach to intellectual-disability determinations.”361 Alcala concluded
by asserting that Wood should receive the opportunity “for further
evidentiary development and factual findings under the proper
standard[,]” because the trial court’s “fact findings and conclusions fail
to comport with the current medical diagnostic framework[.]”362
In its unpublished 2018 Thomas v. State decision, the Texas CCA
conveyed that Moore I “reject[ed] the use of the factors this Court set
out in Ex parte Briseno to evaluate a defendant’s adaptive functioning,”
because their “application . . . departs from current medical standards
and clinical practice[.]”363 The court emphasized that, while the defense
expert evaluated Thomas according to the DSM-5, the state-appointed
expert “conflated the old and the current standard” by allowing “his
opinion [to be] guided by the Briseno factors.”364 Equally concerning,
the state “sought examples of adaptive abilities which fell within the

358

359
360
361
362
363

364

Id. at 686. The original rationale that Newell mentions is, presumably, that
persons with intellectual disabilities are less morally culpable for their crimes, and
therefore undeserving of the criminal justice system’s most severe punishment—
death.
Id. (Alcala, J., dissenting).
Id. at 687.
Id.
Id. at 688.
Thomas v. State, NO. AP-77,047, 2018 WL 6332526, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec.
5, 2018) (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049–51 (2017)).
Id. at *17.

50

UMass Law Review

v. 16 | 2

Briseno factors.”365 As a result, the Texas CCA determined, that it
“cannot ignore [the state expert’s] obvious adherence to the Briseno
factors in forming the basis for his opinions that he presented to the
jury.”366 The court reasoned, “it would be a violation of Thomas’s due
process rights if the jury’s determination of intellectual disabilit[ies]
was based on misleading expert testimony” and therefore “Thomas
[was] entitled to a new punishment hearing.”367
Finally, in 2019, the Texas CCA granted a stay of execution in Ex
parte Milam, due to “recent changes in the law pertaining to the issue of
intellectual disabilit[ies]” triggered by that decision in Moore I.368 The
purpose of this stay was to provide the trial court with sufficient time to
conduct “a review of the merits of [Milam’s] claims.”369 Justice
Richardson concurred, commenting, “[t]here was no legal basis upon
which to challenge the use of the Briseno factors as the proper
diagnostic standard for evaluating claims of intellectual disabilit[ies]”
prior to Moore I.370 Therefore, Milam clearly “did not forfeit then his
right to a stay of execution now simply because his trial and writ
attorneys lacked clairvoyance.”371 Justice Yeary dissented, remarking
that “it does not appear that [Milam] has challenged Briseno at any
earlier stage in these capital murder proceedings. If there was any trial
objection, it was not reiterated and pursued on direct appeal.”372
According to Yeary, “[a]t least as of 2010, it is clear enough that an
argument could reasonably have been fashioned . . . that Briseno should
be overruled.”373 For this reason, Yeary believed that Milam “should
therefore have raised his intellectual disability claim in his initial writ
application.”374 Moreover, Yeary objected to the Majority opinion
because:
to authorize the convicting court to entertain [Milam’s] claim now,
although raised for the first time in a subsequent writ application
365
366
367
368

369
370
371
372
373
374

Id.
Id.
Id. at *19.
Ex parte Milam, NO. WR-79,322-02, 2019 WL 190209, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App.
Jan. 14, 2019) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. (Richardson, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. (Yeary, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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when the argument was readily available to be raised in his initial
writ application, would violate both the letter and certainly the spirit
of our codified abuse-of-the-writ provision[.]375

B. The Standard Error of Measurement
Courts from ten different states cited Moore I or Moore II to address
aspects of IQ testing, including the SEM. The Alabama CCA, for
example, interpreted Moore I to require states to evaluate defendants for
adaptive deficits when their IQ score, adjusted for the SEM, showed
evidence of subaverage intellectual functioning according to current
medical standards.376 In a separate case, the Alabama CCA interpreted
Moore I as supporting the use of a universal “standard error of
measurement of 5” that must be applied to every defendants’ IQ score,
with adjusted scores of 70 or lower satisfying the first prong for
intellectual disabilities.377 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alabama
observed in another case that Moore I criticized the Texas CCA for
“disregarding the defendant’s lower IQ scores and failing to consider
‘the standard error of measurement.’”378 Subsequently, the court
acknowledged that
[i]t is undisputed that Carroll’s IQ score of 71, adjusted for the
standard of measurement, yields a range of 66 to 76. Indeed, the
Court of Criminal Appeals found that [the] lower end of Carroll’s
score range falls at or below 70. Thus, there is no dispute that Carroll
has [satisfied the first prong for intellectual disabilities].379

In the 2019 Graham v. State case, the Alabama CCA considered Moore
I to reiterate Hall’s stipulation that states must examine all evidence of
intellectual disabilities, even in instances where a defendant fails to
meet the first prong for intellectual disabilities by scoring above 70 on
all IQ tests, properly adjusted for the SEM.380
The California Supreme Court explained that Moore I “dictates that
[this court] must also consider petitioner’s adaptive functioning”
because: (1) “[p]etitioner has two IQ scores that fall at or below 70
without adjustment for the standard error of measurement”; and (2)
“[h]is score of 73 on the WAIS-R yields a range of 68 to 78 or, if
375
376
377
378
379
380

Id.
Callen v. State, 284 So. 3d 177, 197 n.6 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017).
Carroll I, 300 So. 3d, 51, 55 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017).
Carroll II, 300 So. 3d, 59, 63 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017)).
Id. (citations omitted).
Graham v. State, 299 So. 3d 273, 331 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019).
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rescored as 71, produces a range of 66 to 76.”381 In Kansas, the state’s
supreme court noted that Moore I deemed the Texas CCA’s “analysis
of Moore’s IQ scores” unacceptable in light of Hall
because it failed to account for the standard error of measurement;
and because Moore had an IQ of 74, when adjusted for the standard
error of measurement he had an IQ range of 69-79. This meant the
lower end of the range fell below 70, so the Texas Court was
required under Hall to consider Moore’s adaptive functioning.382

The Florida Supreme Court claimed that “Moore [I] generally
embodies a simple affirmation of the principles announced in Hall in
Wright v. State.”383 The Florida Supreme Court did not take issue with
how the post-conviction court handled the case because it
“acknowledged that Wright’s IQ score range–adjusted for the SEM–fell
into the borderline ID range and the lowest end of the range dipped 1
point beneath 70; therefore, Wright was allowed to offer evidence of
adaptive functioning.”384 Accordingly, Florida permitted defendants
who scored 70 or lower on an IQ test, after incorporating the SEM, to
present evidence of their alleged adaptive deficits.385 Contrary to current
medical standards, however, the court argued that “[n]either Hall nor
Moore [I] requires a significantly subaverage intelligence finding when
one of many IQ scores falls into the ID range.”386 The court rejected the
proposition that an IQ test score at or below 70, once adjusted for the
SEM, necessarily qualified a defendant as having met the first criteria
for intellectual disabilities.
While this interpretation is clearly an outlier, the Florida Supreme
Court sought to conceal its departure from Supreme Court precedent by
claiming that its decision did, in fact, comport with Hall and Moore I.
The court asserted it did “not employ a strict cutoff, and consider[ed]
other evidence of ID when clinical experts would do the same.”387 This
assertion is dubious, however, because the Moore II Court ruled that
Moore met the first criteria for intellectual disabilities on the basis that
“Moore’s intellectual testing indicated his was a borderline case, but
that he had demonstrated sufficient intellectual-functioning deficits to
381
382
383
384
385
386
387

In re Lewis, 417 P.3d 756, 766 (Cal. 2018).
State v. Thurber, 420 P.3d 389, 447 (Kan. 2018).
Wright II, 256 So. 3d 766, 771 (Fla. 2018).
Id. at 772.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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require consideration of the second criterion—adaptive functioning.”388
Here, the Supreme Court is likely referencing Moore I, where it noted:
(1) “Moore’s score of 74, adjusted for the standard error of
measurement, yield[ed] a range of 69 to 79”; and (2) “[b]ecause the
lower end of Moore’s score range falls at or below 70, the CCA had to
move on to consider Moore’s adaptive functioning.”389 Moreover, the
Moore II Court described the first prong as “primarily a test-related
criterion.”390 The proper way to understand the Court’s instructions,
therefore, is that an IQ score at or below 70, once the SEM has been
incorporated, satisfies the first prong, but does not qualify the defendant
as intellectually disabled unless they also meet the adaptive deficit
criteria. Indeed, the Moore I Court said as much when it wrote:
we do not end the intellectual-disability inquiry, one way or the
other, based on Moore’s IQ score. Rather, in line with Hall, we
require that courts continue the inquiry and consider other evidence
of intellectual disability where an individual’s IQ score, adjusted for
the test’s standard error, falls within the clinically established range
for intellectual-functioning deficits.391

The Florida Supreme Court offered no explanation as to why Wright’s
IQ score of 69 did not meet the first prong for intellectual disabilities,
and it erroneously reached its conclusion only after disregarding clear
Court instructions and current medical standards.392
Discussing Moore I, the Supreme Court of Kentucky remarked that
“the prevailing tone of the U.S. Supreme Court’s examination of this
issue suggests that a determination based solely on IQ score, even after
388
389
390
391
392

Moore II, 139 S. Ct. 666, 668 (2019).
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017).
Moore II, 139 S. Ct. at 668 (citing DSM–5 supra note 180, at 37).
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1050.
The United States Supreme Court recognized that the DSM–5 represented current
medical standards, id. at 1048. The standard states that
Intellectual functioning is typically measured with individually
administered and psychometrically valid, comprehensive, culturally
appropriate, psychometrically sound tests of intelligence.
Individuals with intellectual disability have scores of approximately
two standard deviations or more below the population mean,
including a margin for measurement error (generally +5 points). On
tests with a standard deviation of 15 and a mean of 100, this involves
a score of 65-75 (70 ± 5). Clinical training and judgment are required
to interpret test results and assess intellectual performance.
DSM–5 supra note 180, at 37.
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proper statistical-error adjustments have been made, is highly
suspect[.]”393 The Kentucky court arrived at this understanding despite
saying, “[i]t is also true that the U.S. Supreme Court seems to suggest
that a defendant’s IQ score, after adjusting for statistical error, acts as
the preliminary inquiry that could foreclose consideration of other
evidence of intellectual disabilit[ies], depending on the score.”394
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Kentucky proclaimed that “routine
application of a bright-line test alone to determine death-penaltydisqualifying intellectual disability is an exercise in futility.”395 Thus,
the court held “that any rule of law that states that a criminal defendant
automatically cannot be ruled intellectually disabled and precluded from
execution simply because he or she has an IQ of 71 or above, even after
adjustment for statistical error, is unconstitutional.”396 Accordingly, the
court struck down “KRS 532.130(2), a statute with an outdated test for
ascertaining intellectually [sic] disability[.]”397
In State v. Russell, the Mississippi Supreme Court overturned the
lower court’s finding that Russell was intellectually disabled.398 While
incarcerated, Russell incurred two separate charges: (1) capital murder
for killing a corrections officer, for which he was convicted and
sentenced to death;399 and (2) aggravated assault of a corrections officer
while on death row.400 During the aggravated assault case, Russell was
evaluated by two state experts and a defense expert for a total of “three
psychological tests” to determine whether “he was competent to confess
voluntarily and to stand trial” and whether he “was not insane” during

393
394
395
396
397

398
399
400

Woodall v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 2. The statute at issue provided that “[a] defendant with significant
subaverage intellectual functioning existing concurrently with substantial deficits
in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period is referred
to in KRS 532.135 and 532.140 as a defendant with a serious intellectual
disability. ‘Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning’ is defined
as an intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.130(2) (West 2012), invalidated by Woodall v. Commonwealth, 563
S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. 2018) (statute language enabling a “bright-line” IQ score finding
was counterintuitive to the diagnostic framework of the medical community).
State v. Russell, 2015-KA-00245-SCT (¶ 27) (Miss. 2017).
Id. at (¶ 6).
Id. at (¶ 8).
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the commission of the offense.401 Years later, the state requested access
to Russell so that it could evaluate him for intellectual disabilities in
conjunction with the capital case.402 The defense objected to the state’s
request because the state had already evaluated Russell during the
aggravated assault case.403 When asked why he sought access, the state
expert testified that he desired to “administer the most up-to-date”
version of the IQ test Russell had previously taken, and to “test Russell
for adaptive-functioning deficits—something that he and his colleagues
did not assess” during the initial evaluation.404
The trial judge “decided no further testing was needed to form an
expert Atkins opinion,” and subsequently “ruled the State had not shown
good cause to administer any further tests.”405 From the trial court’s
perspective, allowing the state expert to evaluate Russell on a second
occasion would place the defense at a disadvantage.406 During the Atkins
hearing, the defense expert presented evidence that Russell was
“intellectually disabled, based on Russell’s prior IQ scores, his
adaptive-functioning deficits, and his placement in special-education
classes, indicating onset prior to age eighteen.”407 When given the
chance, “the State announced it would not present any witnesses.”408
Accordingly, the trial court found sufficient evidence of Russell’s
intellectual disabilities and “entered an order vacating Russell’s death
sentence.”409
Upon appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that “the trial
court abused its discretion when it ruled the State had ‘adequate
opportunity’ and information to evaluate Russell’s Atkins claim.”410 The
court based its holding on the fact that “the State doctors were not
ordered to and did not evaluate Russell’s claim that he was intellectually
disabled[]” during their interviews with Russell in association with the
aggravated assault case.411 The state, therefore, “was not seeking a
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411

Id. at (¶ 12).
Id. at (¶ 13).
Id.
Id. at (¶ 15).
Id. at (¶ 17).
Id.
Id. at (¶ 18).
Id. at (¶ 19).
Id.
Id. at (¶ 21).
Id. at (¶ 22).
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second, duplicate Atkins evaluation. It was requesting the Atkins
evaluation.”412 The court further explained, “[t]he State made this
request not to redo what had already been done[,]”413 but, rather, its
expert sought to adhere to current medical standards by: (1) gathering
data to assess the issue at hand rather than repurposing old data collected
for a different reason; (2) assessing Russell’s adaptive deficits for the
first time; and (3) administering the most recent version of the IQ test
previously taken by Russell.414 By ruling as it did, the trial court erred
because “instead of being informed by the medical expert on what
assessments are necessary, it was the trial judge who informed the
expert what assessments were sufficient.”415 As a result, the Mississippi
Supreme Court found that “the trial court not only improperly stepped
into the role of a forensic psychologist, but it also broke with this
Court’s precedent recognizing that the medical expert is in the best
position to determine what testing is sufficient to form an opinion on the
petitioner’s intellectual disability.”416 In concluding its reasoning, the
Mississippi Supreme Court declared that, “[b]ecause our Atkins
procedures clearly contemplate the State responding to the petitioner’s
evidence with its own expert opinion, the trial court abused its discretion
when it restricted the State in this way.”417
Chief Justice Waller dissented, pointing out that “[t]he State, aware
of Russell’s Atkins claim, requested that Russell be evaluated at one
time for the purposes of both cases[.]”418 He explained that “Russell
agreed to this procedure on the condition that, to the extent possible, the
results of his mental evaluation in the assault case would serve the
State’s purposes for the Atkins claim and that he would not be subjected
to additional testing.”419 Waller also recognized that “the reports from
Russell’s [initial] psychological evaluations were not rendered
meaningless in the Atkins context simply because they did not contain
conclusions on Russell’s intellectual disability.”420 Moreover, Waller
quoted the state’s expert who, in a previous case, declined to administer
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420

Id. at (¶ 23).
Id.
Id. at (¶ ¶ 23, 24, 25).
Id. at (¶ 26).
Id.
Id. at (¶ 27).
Id.
Id.
Id. at (¶ 33).
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tests assessing adaptive functioning because he considered the practice
unsound given how long the defendant had spent in prison.421 Waller
concluded that if the state expert truly sought to assess Russell’s
adaptive deficits, he could have used acceptable methods that did “not
require direct contact with or testing of the defendant.”422
In his dissent, Waller also observed that the Moore I Court
considered Moore to have met the first prong for intellectual disabilities
“based solely on the results of an IQ test administered to the defendant
in 1989, even though the defendant’s Atkins hearing was held in 2014
and the defendant had taken more recent IQ tests.”423 In other words,
Waller thought Moore I signified that an IQ score of 70 or below, once
adjusted for the SEM, satisfied the first prong for intellectual disabilities
regardless of how long ago that IQ test had been administered—
provided that the test in question was consistent with the current medical
standards at the time of administration. Waller noted that the state and
defense experts agreed that Russell’s scores should be adjusted for the
Flynn Effect,424 which decreased his scores to “66 and 72.”425
Additionally, the state expert had “testified that the [tests] were the most
up-to-date IQ tests available at the time they were administered to
Russell.”426 Therefore, Waller considered “the psychological testing
already available to the trial court [to have] established that Russell
satisfied” the first prong for intellectual disabilities.427 Furthermore,
421
422
423
424

425
426
427

Id. at (¶ 35).
Id.
Id. at (¶ 37) (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017)).
The Flynn Effect refers to the fact that, over time, individuals have been scoring
higher on IQ tests compared to the population that the test was normed on. Thus,
comparing a recent score with the average score obtained by an outdated
population artificially inflates the recent score. In death penalty cases, this
increases the risk that persons with intellectual disabilities will be incorrectly
assessed as intellectually able and subsequently executed. In order to counteract
the Flynn Effect, IQ scores are lowered according to set practices. See DSM–5,
supra note 180 at 37 (defining the Flynn effect as “overly high scores due to outof-date test norms”). See also Frank M. Gresham & Daniel J. Reschly, Standard
of Practice and Flynn Effect Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, 49 INTELL. &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 131 (2011); John H. Blume, Sheri Johnson &
Christopher W. Seeds, Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions
of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
689 (2009).
Russell, 2015-KA-00245-SCT at (¶ 37).
Id. at (¶ 38).
Id. at (¶ 37).

58

UMass Law Review

v. 16 | 2

“[t]he state presented no evidence suggesting that those scores were
invalid or that they could not be used in an Atkins analysis[,]” and the
State’s expert himself testified that “Russell probably would produce a
lower score on the [most recent version of the IQ test] than he did on
the [now-outdated version that he took].”428 Waller concluded
the trial court correctly weighed the need for additional intelligence
testing against the existing evidence of Russell’s intellectual
functioning, along with the risk of testing error, and determined that
the State had not shown good cause to conduct additional testing.
Under these facts, I would not find that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the State’s request to have its own expert
administer the [newest version of the IQ test] to Russell. 429

In Johnson v. State, Justice Stith dissented from the majority’s
finding that Johnson’s counsel was not ineffective despite his failure to:
(1) recognize that Johnson’s IQ, which was “between 53 and 63,” would
have likely exempted him from the death penalty during an Atkins
hearing; and (2) familiarize himself with intellectual disabilities
diagnostic criteria and relevant Supreme Court cases.430 According to
Stith, Moore I demonstrated that if a defendant’s IQ score, adjusted for
the SEM, is 70 or lower, courts must assess defendants for evidence of
adaptive functioning.431 Stith expounded upon what she perceived to be
the correct procedures for evaluating capital defendants’ intellectual
disabilities, writing,
[t]o determine whether there is evidence of low intellectual
functioning, clinicians give multiple IQ scores and account for a
standard error of measurement (five points) when an IQ score is
close to, but above 70. Then, to determine whether this low IQ is
accompanied by adaptive behavior deficits, clinicians, preferably
using standardized instruments, should examine records from
childhood and interview those who knew the defendant, looking
only at whether the defendant, when in a non-penal environment,
exhibited deficits in conceptual, social, or practice skills. Finally,
some evidence of the deficits should be available before age 18.432

In State v. Ryan, the Oregon Supreme Court considered a noncapital case involving sexual abuse perpetrated by an intellectually

428
429
430
431
432

Id. at (¶ 39).
Id.
Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 908–09 (Mo. 2019) (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 915.
Id. at 916 (internal citations omitted).
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disabled defendant.433 Extensive evidence, accepted by both the state
and defense, demonstrated that Ryan was intellectually disabled.434 The
Oregon Supreme Court cited Moore I to support its claim that, “even for
offenders who test above that cut-off IQ score [of 70–75], deficits in the
offender’s adaptive functioning are relevant to a determination of
intellectual disability.”435 Because the Supreme Court “in Atkins
repeatedly emphasized the relevance of intellectual disability in
determining both the gravity of an offense and the severity of its
penalty,” the Oregon Supreme Court found that “[e]vidence of an
offender’s intellectual disability . . . is relevant to a proportionality
determination where sentencing laws require the imposition of a term of
imprisonment without consideration of such evidence.”436 Similarly, the
court affirmed that “the undisputed evidence at sentencing showed that
defendant is an intellectually disabled offender who has an IQ score
between 50 and 60, a full ten to twenty points below the cutoff IQ score
for the intellectual function prong of the intellectual disability definition
recognized in Hall.”437 As a result, the Oregon Supreme Court held that
“the trial court erred . . . because [it] failed to consider evidence of
defendant’s intellectual disability when that evidence, if credited, would
establish that the sentence would be arguably unconstitutional because
it shows that defendant’s age-specific intellectual capacity fell below
the minimum age level of criminal responsibility for a child.”438 The

433
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435

436
437
438

State v. Ryan, 396 P.3d 867, 868 (Or. 2017).
A total of four mental health professionals conducted evaluations and
[a]ll the evaluators diagnosed defendant with intellectual
disabilities. The first evaluator reported an IQ score of 50 for
defendant, the most recent IQ test scored defendant at 60, and each
evaluator found significant impairment in his adaptive functioning.
Defendant represented to the court that he functioned at an
approximate mental age of 10, and the state did not dispute that
representation.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 875. In other words, even if a defendant failed to obtain IQ test scores at or
below 70, once adjusted for the SEM, and therefore was considered to have not
met the first prong of the intellectual disabilities diagnostic criteria, Oregon’s
Supreme Court understood Moore I to still require the state courts to provide the
defendant the opportunity to present evidence of adaptive deficits. Id.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 868–69.
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court concluded by vacating Ryan’s “75-month prison term”439 and
remanding to the circuit court for a new sentence that considered
evidence of his intellectual disabilities.440
For the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Moore I “established that
IQ test scores must be considered while accounting for any SEM.”441
This court recognized Moore I provided “the presence of other sources
of imprecision in administering the test to a particular
individual . . . cannot narrow the test-specific standard error range.”442
Therefore, it interpreted Moore I to prohibit state courts from using a
SEM less than +/- 5 points.443 The court also considered that the Moore
I Court
held that an IQ score in the ranges present in that case did not end
the inquiry, reaffirming Hall. [Instead, it was] necessary to consider
other evidence of intellectual disability, particularly adaptive
deficits, in line with accepted principles of the medical
community.444

In light of these instructions, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
criticized the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) court for
“discount[ing] the results of the 1987 WAIS-R test based on the
possibility that testing conditions affected the result.”445 Pennsylvania’s
Supreme Court concluded that the PCRA court erred when it “argued
particular circumstances justified disregarding the lower end of the
SEM score.”446
The Texas CCA did not share the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s
interpretation of Moore I. In Ex parte Wood, the Texas CCA deferred to
the habeas court’s judgment in discarding IQ test scores that “ranged
439
440
441
442
443
444

445

446

Id. at 869.
Id. at 880.
Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 377 (Pa. 2019).
Id. at 377–78 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017)).
Id. at 388.
Id. at 387. The court noted that “Moore’s IQ scores included one score of 78 with
none under 70.” Id.
Id. at 388. The test in question “yielded an overall [IQ] score of 69[,]” which is
below the threshold required to qualify a capital defendant as a person with
intellectual disabilities. Id. at 379.
Id. at 388. In Moore I, for example, the Supreme Court noted that the Texas CCA
relied on Moore’s poor academic performance and the depressive symptoms he
was experiencing when he took the IQ test to justify disregarding the lower bound
of the test, which was 69 after subtracting the SEM of 5 from the initial score of
74. 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1047 (2017).
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from 64 to 111[,]” ultimately retaining a single “test [that] yielded a full
scale IQ score of 75 . . . .”447 Based on this test, the habeas court ruled
that Wood failed to meet the first criteria for intellectual disabilities.448
The Texas CCA affirmed the habeas court’s decision, writing:
Because the only test with any validity yielded an IQ score that, even
accounting for standard measurement error, is not within the range
for intellectually disabled persons and because even that score
appears to understate Applicant’s intelligence due to the strong
evidence of malingering, Applicant has failed the first prong of the
intellectual-disability framework, and there is no need to conduct an
adaptive-deficits inquiry.449

The Texas CCA’s decision is suspect on multiple fronts. First, the
Hall Court observed that “an individual with an IQ test score ‘between
70 and 75 or lower’ may show intellectual disability by presenting
additional evidence regarding difficulties in adaptive functioning.”450
As such, Supreme Court precedent definitively established that
defendants who scored 75 on an IQ test satisfied the first criteria for
intellectual disabilities, and courts should proceed to the second prong
and assess them for adaptive deficits. Second, the broader significance
of Hall is that the Court ruled “[i]t is not sound to view a single factor
as dispositive of a conjunctive and interrelated assessment[;]” however,

447
448

449
450

Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Id. The IQ test in question had an ascribed “measurement error range of 71 to 80
(-4, +5).” Id.
Id. at 680–81.
Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 722 (2014) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 309 n.5 (2002)). Meaning, the Hall Court explicitly adopted this aspect of
current medical standards as its own, removing doubt as to whether states had
discretion to use a stricter cutoff score. Id. at 723. This language superseded that
of the Atkins Court, which declared that “an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower . . . is
typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the
mental retardation definition.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.5 (2002).
While the Atkins Court may have left some doubt as to whether states could justify
using a cutoff score other than 75, the Hall Court clearly closed this loophole by
removing the word “typically.” In Atkins, the Supreme Court referenced a
psychiatry textbook to note that current medical standards “typically” considered
scores ranging between 70 and 75 as meeting the first criteria for establishing
intellectual disabilities despite referencing typical current medical standards. Id.
However, the Atkins Court did not explicitly require states to use this cutoff, on
the contrary, the Court left it to the states to decide how to assess intellectual
disabilities. Id. at 317.
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that is exactly what the Texas CCA did in Wood.451 Third, by upholding
the habeas court’s highly suspect SEM of minus four but plus five IQ
points, the Texas CCA adopted a position that even dissenting Justice
Alito identified as incompatible with the majority’s decision.452 Ex parte
Wood, therefore, is not a product of the Texas CCA misinterpreting
unclear or ambiguous instructions from the Supreme Court, but rather a
blatant, calculated, and harmful expression of defiance against the
Court’s unmistakable ruling. The fourth reason Texas’s decision is
suspect is that even if it was permissible for states to use SEM’s smaller
than five, the Supreme Court may have rendered disputes over SEM’s
immaterial by stating that, “[i]n Hall v. Florida, we held that a State
cannot refuse to entertain other evidence of intellectual disability when
a defendant has an IQ score above 70.”453 Fifth, the Hall Court
highlighted the absurdity of “Florida seek[ing] to execute a man because
he scored a 71 instead of 70 on an IQ test.”454 By upholding the habeas
court’s SEM of minus four but plus five that produced a range of 71 to
80, the Texas CCA’s opinion differs from the decision overturned by
the Hall Court only in semantics.455 Finally, the Moore I Court rejected
451

452

453

454
455

Hall, 572 U.S. at 723. Expounding upon this principle, the Hall Court indicated
that “[i]ntellectual disability is a condition, not a number,” and that “an IQ test
score represents a range rather than a fixed number.” Id.
Although Alito dissented, he recognized that the Court had instituted “a five-point
margin of error” in order to produce “the number 75 in this case.” Id. at 740 (Alito,
J., dissenting). Alito’s Hall interpretation appears sound given that the Moore I
Court applied a five-point SEM when it observed that “Moore’s score of 74,
adjusted for the standard error of measurement, yield[ed] a range of 69 to 79.”
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017). The Moore I Court explicitly denounced
the Texas CCA for “discount[ing] the lower end of the standard-error range
associated with [Moore’s IQ] scores.” Id. at 1047. In doing so, the Supreme Court
unequivocally rejected any attempt to shrink the SEM from the five-point margin
that Hall required.
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1048. On its face, the Moore I Court appears to be endorsing
the view that no IQ score is too high to justify prohibiting defendants from
submitting evidence of adaptive deficits for consideration. Critics, however, may
point out that the Moore I Court also wrote “in line with Hall, we require that
courts continue the inquiry and consider other evidence of intellectual disability
where an individual’s IQ score, adjusted for the test’s standard error, falls within
the clinically established range for intellectual-functioning deficits.” Id. at 1050.
Hall, 572 U.S. at 724.
Both rulings manufactured a scenario where a single point difference on an IQ
test determined whether the defendant qualified as intellectually disabled and
exempt from the death penalty. Therefore, despite taking the suspect SEM into
account, the Texas CCA’s affirmation of the habeas court’s ruling is hard to
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the Briseno factors partially because they were “an outlier” relative “to
other States’ handling of intellectual-disability pleas.”456 Therefore, the
Texas decision in Ex parte Wood is also an outlier because it: (1) used
a standard error of measurement less than five; and (2) prohibited an
investigation into adaptive deficits based solely on an IQ score. 457 In
contrast to Texas, other states have overwhelmingly relied on a standard
measurement error of +/- five points and allowed inquiries into adaptive
deficits even if a capital defendant’s IQ score failed to fall below the
cutoff.458

456
457

458

square with the Hall Court’s de-emphasis of specific IQ scores in favor of
evidence of adaptive deficits.
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1052.
Ex parte Wood may also be an outlier relative to other Texas CCA cases. In its
unpublished Thomas v. State opinion, the court noted that the state-retained expert
testified that, “the numbers attributable to Thomas’s IQ score is a range of 68 to
75, and that his ‘full scale’ IQ is 71.” NO. AP-77,047, 2018 WL 6332526, at *12
(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2018). Thus, according to the state expert, Thomas’ IQ
score conveniently fell a single point short of meeting the first prong for
intellectual disabilities. During cross-examination, however, the state expert
acknowledged that he did, in fact, consider Thomas to meet the first criteria for
intellectual disabilities, although his earlier testimony framed the issue as if
Thomas did not. Id. at *16. For its part, the Texas CCA recognized that
[a]ccording to the Supreme Court, Bobby Moore’s IQ score of 74,
adjusted for the standard error of measurement, yielded a range of
69 to 79, and so, because the lower end of Moore’s score range fell
at or below 70, this Court had to move on to consider Moore’s
adaptive functioning.
Id. at *3. Thus, in this case, the Texas CCA appeared to interpret Moore I as
requiring an SEM of +/- 5 and prohibiting states from narrowing this range for
any reason.
In Carroll v. State, Alabama’s CCA acknowledged that the Moore I Court
required “a standard error of measurement of 5.” 300 So. 3d 51, 55 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2017). Likewise, in Graham v. State, Alabama’s CCA understood Moore I
as requiring states to consider evidence of adaptive deficits even when defendants
scored above 70 in IQ tests. 299 So. 3d 273, 331 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019).
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Kentucky deemed “the prevailing tone of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s examination of this issue [to suggest] that a determination
based solely on IQ score, even after proper statistical-error adjustments have been
made, [to be] highly suspect.” Woodall v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky.
2018). The Supreme Court of Kentucky pronounced that “[w]e now conclude and
hold that any rule of law that states that a criminal defendant automatically cannot
be ruled intellectually disabled and precluded from execution simply because he
or she has an IQ of 71 or above, even after adjustment for statistical error, is
unconstitutional.” Id. at 6. The Oregon Supreme Court expressed the same
opinion, finding “the Court has made clear that, even for offenders who test above
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In summary, the Texas CCA erred in its Ex parte Wood decision
because citing an SEM of minus four from a base IQ test score of 75 in
order to conclude that Wood “failed the first prong of the intellectualdisability framework, and there [was] no need to conduct an adaptivedeficits inquiry[,]”459 is patently unconstitutional in light of Hall and
Moore I. Justice Alcala said as much in her dissent when she asserted,
[t]his Court’s majority opinion cherry picks certain IQ scores and
treats those scores as dispositive evidence of a lack of intellectual
disability. This Court’s majority opinion acknowledges that
applicant’s IQ scores range from 64 to 111, but it dismisses low IQ
scores that would indicate subaverage general intellectual
functioning as the product of malingering. It uncritically assumes
the validity of applicant’s higher IQ scores without addressing
whether the methods used to obtain those scores would still comport
with current medical diagnostic criteria. And perhaps more
importantly, this Court’s cherry-picked IQ score of 75 provides a
worst-case scenario IQ score of 71 based on the ‘measurement error
range.’ This score is only one point above the cutoff score that would
place someone in the range of intellectual disability, when the low
end of the IQ score error range is 70 or below. Under the current
medical diagnostic framework, it is inappropriate to decide that
someone is not intellectually disabled by using a strict cutoff score
taken from a cherry picked IQ test.460

By failing to rein in the habeas court, Alcala contended that:
this Court’s majority opinion employs the same type of incorrect
intellectual disability analysis that it has been conducting mistakenly
for over a decade since issuing its opinion in Ex parte Briseno. The
instant majority opinion continues to selectively focus on only the
IQ scores . . . that would support a determination that applicant is
not intellectually disabled[.]461

C. Highlighting Adaptive Deficits
Courts from nine different states relied on Moore I or Moore II to
address how they should treat aspects of capital defendants’ adaptive
deficits. For example, in Carroll v. State, the Alabama CCA correctly

459
460
461

the cut-off IQ score [of 70-75], deficits in the offender’s adaptive functioning are
relevant to a determination of intellectual disability.” State v. Ryan, 396 P.3d 867,
875 (Or. 2017). Lastly, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court perceived Moore I to
prohibit reliance on SEM’s less than the five points described in Hall.
Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 377–78 (Pa. 2019).
Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Id. at 687 (Alcala, J., dissenting).
Id. at 686–87 (citation omitted).
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interpreted Moore I to mean that “courts should not use adaptive
strengths to negate adaptive deficits.”462 Additionally, that court
considered Moore I to stipulate “that States may not create their own
factors for accessing [sic] adaptive deficits if those factors deviate from
clinical standards.”463 The Supreme Court of Alabama, in turn,
acknowledged that Moore I required evaluating defendants for adaptive
deficits, not adaptive strengths.464 Nevertheless, that court appears to
have focused on Carroll’s adaptive strengths rather than deficits,
including his ability to read, operate a baking mixer, and make some
basic foods.465
The defense expert, on the other hand, found that Carroll displayed
evidence of adaptive deficits.466 According to the Supreme Court of
Alabama, “[t]he circuit court’s primary reason for rejecting the defense
expert’s opinion was that [he] was the only psychologist to conclude
that Carroll suffered from significant adaptive deficits.”467 Therefore,
“[b]ecause the experts’ opinions regarding Carroll’s level of adaptive
functioning . . . were conflicting, it was reasonable for the circuit court
to look to other evidence of Carroll’s adaptive functioning to reconcile
the experts’ competing opinions regarding his abilities [and functional
limitations].”468 Moreover, the circuit court relied on testimony from the
police officer that interviewed Carroll, who attested
that Carroll was able to read his Miranda rights before questioning
him. He stated that Carroll read a sentence on the form out loud to
him and that, during questioning, he appeared to understand his
questions. [The officer] also testified that Carroll had eight or nine

462
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464
465

466
467
468

Carroll I, 300 So. 3d at 55.
Id.
Carroll II, 300 So. 3d 59, 63 (Ala. 2019).
Id. at 65.
Dr. Ford found that the defendant reads novels, self-help books, and
the sports page of the newspaper. Dr. Ford found that the defendant
is able to write letters. The defendant, who has served as a cook in a
prison kitchen, was able to correctly describe to Dr. Ford: (1) how
to bake food items such as biscuits; (2) how to use a large mixer,
and (3) ingredients that were used in some of the food items he made
as a cook.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 72 (citation omitted).
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books in his prison cell, as well as a newspaper clipping about his
prior conviction and two Jet magazines.469

Based on this information, the Supreme Court of Alabama found that
after “weighing the evidence presented, the circuit court discredited the
opinion of [the defense expert], which was within its discretion to
do.”470
Despite the Supreme Court of the United States’ criticism of the
state expert in Moore I for “emphasiz[ing] Moore’s adaptive strengths
in school, at trial, and in prison”471 and the Texas CCA for
“overemphasiz[ing] Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths,”472 the
Supreme Court of Alabama held that it could not “conclude that the
circuit court exceeded its discretion in concluding that Carroll did not
have significant or substantial deficits in adaptive functioning.”473
Given that the circuit court prioritized evidence of Carroll’s reported
adaptive strengths over testimony from his relatives demonstrating
numerous adaptive deficits, it is difficult to reconcile the ruling from the
Supreme Court of Alabama with the principles established in Moore I.
It is even more challenging to square the Alabama holding with the
subsequent Supreme Court decision in Moore II, which found that the
Texas CCA “again relied less upon the adaptive deficits . . . than upon
Moore’s apparent adaptive strengths.”474 Because the Supreme Court of
Alabama decided Ex parte Carroll on April 5, 2019, and the Supreme
Court of the United States decided Moore II on February 19, 2019, it is
telling that the Supreme Court of Alabama’s opinion makes no reference
to Moore II.
In In re Lewis, the California Supreme Court noted that, “[the
Attorney General] urges a focus on [Lewis Jr.’s] adaptive strengths,
including successful gambling in Las Vegas, supporting himself
through illegal activities, maintenance of lasting relationships, and [his]
469
470
471
472
473

474

Id. at 73.
Id.
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1047 (2017).
Id. at 1050.
Carroll II, 300 So. 3d at 74. The circuit court, however, reached its conclusion
largely based on Carroll’s alleged adaptive strengths rather than his deficits.
Additionally, the circuit court discounted the defense expert’s testimony even
though the expert provided evidence collected from “interviews of [Carroll’s]
relatives . . . that [indicated] he had significant deficits in 7 of the 10 areas of
adaptive functioning.” Id. at 76.
Moore II, 139 S. Ct. 666, 670 (2019).
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ability to banter with police when questioned.”475 The court recognized,
however, that the “United States Supreme Court has cautioned against
overemphasizing perceived adaptive strengths to counter evidence of
intellectual disability.”476 The California court observed that the “Moore
[I] court rejected the view that adaptive strengths constitute evidence
adequate to overcome considerable objective evidence of adaptive
deficits, noting the medical community focuses the adaptivefunctioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.”477 As a result, the California
Supreme Court concluded that evidence of Lewis’s “adaptive behaviors
[was] substantially supported,” and therefore “[b]ecause he is
intellectually disabled, [he] is ineligible for execution.”478
The Florida Supreme Court recognized that Moore I criticized the
Texas CCA for improperly relying on Moore’s alleged adaptive
strengths.479 In a revealing statement, however, the Florida Supreme
Court wrote, “[i]t is uncertain exactly where Moore [I] drew the tenuous
line of ‘overemphasis’ on adaptive strengths.”480 This comment
established the groundwork for the Florida Supreme Court to remark
that, “[a]s lawyers, it seems counterintuitive that courts cannot consider
connected adaptive strengths because the existence of certain connected
strengths necessarily illustrates the absence of certain deficits.”481 The
court expounded: “[f]or example, common sense dictates that if a
defendant excels in algebra, then that fact demonstrates a lack of
connected adaptive deficits in math reasoning (i.e., the conceptual
domain).”482 Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court adopted a narrow
interpretation of Moore I, holding it to prohibit citing adaptive strengths
in one domain to refute evidence of adaptive deficits in another domain.
It also asserted that it “did not ‘overemphasize’ Wright’s adaptive
strengths to an extent that ran afoul of Moore [I].”483
475
476
477
478
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480
481
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In re Lewis, 417 P.3d 756, 767 (Cal. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wright II, 256 So. 3d 766, 774 (Fla. 2018).
Id. at 776.
Id.
Id.
Id. Florida’s Supreme Court further quoted Moore I adding emphasis: “even if
clinicians would consider adaptive strengths alongside adaptive weaknesses
within the same adaptive-skill domain, neither Texas nor the dissent identifies any
clinical authority permitting the arbitrary offsetting of deficits against
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Despite the Florida Supreme Court proclaiming itself in compliance
with Moore I, it still considered relevant that
Wright gave extensive testimony at his trial, withstood crossexamination, and understood the ramifications of waiving his
penalty phase jury during a waive colloquy. Also, [the court]
recounted that lay witnesses who knew Wright throughout his life–
including his cousin and aunt–testified that he learned to work in a
fast-paced shelving job at a grocery store, did not have problems
understanding them, and knew how to use the city bus system. 484

Subsequently, the court decided, “[a]ll of that evidence cuts against a
finding of adaptive deficits in the conceptual domain.”485 For this
reason, the Florida Supreme Court argued that, “Wright’s position is
less about Moore [I] than it is a mere reassertion that his expert . . . was
more reliable than the State’s[.]”486 Ultimately, the court “conclude[d]
that the overemphasis issue, as identified by the Supreme Court in
Moore [I], is not present here because we did not arbitrarily offset
deficits with unconnected strengths[.]”487 The Florida Supreme Court
brazenly adopted this view even though the Moore I Court clearly
communicated that “the medical community focuses the adaptivefunctioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.”488
This Florida ruling evokes the Supreme Court’s words in Moore II,
where the Court criticized the Texas CCA’s decision for “rest[ing] upon
analysis too much of which too closely resembles what we previously
found improper.”489 The Florida Supreme Court may be correct that its
reliance on Wright’s adaptive strengths technically differs from the
Texas CCA’s focus on Moore’s adaptive strengths, because Florida
aimed to refute adaptive deficits with related strengths, whereas the
Texas CCA discounted deficits based on unrelated strengths.
Nevertheless, the end result of both courts’ analyses is effectively the
same: compelling evidence of adaptive deficits is blatantly ignored in
favor of adaptive strengths which, the courts argue, would support a

484
485
486
487
488
489

unconnected strengths in which the [Texas Court of Criminal Appeals] engaged.”
Id. (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 n.8 (2017)).
Id. at 778 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 777.
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017).
Moore II, 139 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2019).
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finding that the defendant is intellectually able, and therefore eligible
for execution.490
The Mississippi Supreme Court understood the United States
Supreme Court, in Moore II, to have “reiterated its warning from Moore
I, specifically pointing out that trial courts should rely on adaptive-skill
deficits rather than adaptive skill strengths.”491 One of the issues
surrounding Carr v. State is that the trial court found “Carr ha[d]
demonstrated adaptive skill deficits in at least two (2) of the adaptive
skill areas[.]”492 The Mississippi Supreme Court took issue because “the
trial court did not find significant adaptive-skill deficits.”493 Justice
King dissented, calling attention to the “overwhelming evidence that
[Carr] had significant deficits in several domains of adaptive
functioning.”494 According to King
[t]his is not even a case of opposing experts. The evidence showed
that one expert stated Carr could be intellectually disabled but that
he was not certain. Yet Carr presented evidence from two experts
stating that he was intellectually disabled, presented school records
that showed significant academic deficits, presented testimony
indicating that Carr had to be told when to tie his shoes and when to
bathe, and presented IQ tests showing significant intellectual
deficits.495

Consequently, King opined, “clearly the greater weight of the evidence
showed that Carr was intellectually disabled within the meaning of
Atkins.”496
When dissenting from the Supreme Court of Missouri’s majority
opinion in Johnson v. State, Justice Stith interpreted Moore I as
criticizing the Texas CCA’s focus on Moore’s alleged adaptive
490

491
492

493

494
495
496

When reading the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Wright v. State (II), one could
be forgiven for mistaking it for the Texas CCA’s opinions in either Ex parte
Moore I or Ex parte Moore II, because of the similarities in both tone and intent
of those decisions. It would be puzzling indeed, therefore, if this decision passed
constitutional muster.
Carr v. State, 2017-CA-01481-SCT (¶16 n.5) (Miss. 2019).
Id. at (¶34). The trial court described how the defense expert “found deficits in all
three domains and in 8 of the 10 adaptive skills.” Id. at (¶31).
Id. at (¶34). In Chase v. State, Mississippi’s Supreme Court wrote that “significant
limitations in adaptive behavior are operationally defined as performance that is
approximately two standard deviations below the mean[.]” 2013-CA-01089-SCT
(¶70) (Miss. 2015) (quoting AAIDD–11, supra note 180, at 43).
Carr, 2017-CA-01481-SCT at (¶48) (King, J., dissenting).
Id. at (¶64).
Id.
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strengths rather than his adaptive deficits.497 Similarly, she argued that
Moore II, held that “it was inappropriate for the Texas courts to look at
Moore’s supposed skills through anecdotal evidence from counsel
regarding Moore’s ability to talk and communicate, rather than focusing
on the evidence of his deficits in [those] areas.”498
In its unpublished State v. Covington opinion, the Supreme Court of
Nevada drew attention to the fact that both the defense and state experts
“agreed that Covington had significant adaptive deficits.”499 The
difference, however, was that the defense expert “attributed [those]
deficits to intellectual disability,” whereas the state expert “insisted that
they could have resulted from gaps in instruction, antisocial personality
traits, or chronic substance abuse.”500 The Supreme Court of Nevada
cited Moore I when determining that
[the state expert’s] conclusion is infirm because it does not
recognize that people with intellectual disabilit[ies] often have
comorbid psychological disorders and such a disorder should not be
considered evidence that a defendant does not have an intellectual
disability, nor is a defendant required to show that his adaptive
deficits are specifically caused by an intellectual disability.501

Additionally, the court found that “[t]he State’s arguments also
improperly rely on Covington’s adaptive strengths to compensate for
any asserted deficits,” when the Moore I Court stipulated that “the focus
is on adaptive deficits rather than any perceived adaptive strengths.”502
As proof of Covington’s adaptive deficits, the Supreme Court of Nevada
articulated the following:
Family members acknowledged that Covington had generally lower
comprehension than his siblings or peers; was oblivious to the
consequences of his actions; was unable to follow movie plots,
497
498
499

500
501

502

Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 915 (Mo. 2019) (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id.
State v. Covington, No. 71914, 2019 WL 368915, at *2 (Nev. Jan. 22, 2019)
(unpublished table decision).
Id.
Id. The United States Supreme Court wrote that “many intellectually disabled
people also have other mental or physical impairments . . . . The existence of a
personality disorder or mental-health issue, in short, is ‘not evidence that a person
does not also have intellectual disability.’” Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051 (2017)
(quoting Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (No. 15-797), 2016 WL
4151451, at *19.).
Covington, 2019 WL 368915, at *3 (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1050).
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literature, or conversations; and was gullible, lacked insight into
others’ emotions, and generally did not engage in the typical
behaviors of an independent adult, including consistent
employment, budgeting, and parental problem solving.503

In Commonwealth v. VanDivner, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania recognized Moore I as confirming that when “assessing
an individual’s adaptive functioning for the purpose of determining
whether the individual is intellectually disabled under Atkins, the focus
should be on the individual’s adaptive deficits, rather than his or her
adaptive strengths.”504 At VanDivner’s Atkins hearing, an expert for the
defense testified that VanDivner “was incapable of reading a
newspaper, managing a checkbook, or finding a name in a telephone
directory.”505 The expert for the State, however, considered the fact that
VanDivner wrote the sentence “I love you” as evidence that he did not
possess adaptive deficits, since a witness had previously “testified that
[he] was unable to write a sentence.”506 The expert “suggested that
[VanDivner’s] limitations in adaptive functioning in the areas of
personal care and home-living were the result of [his] substance
abuse.”507
At the PCRA hearing, an expert for the State also testified that
VanDivner could not be intellectually disabled because he possessed a
Commercial Driver’s License (CDL).508 In response, a witness
testified that, because she was concerned that [VanDivner] would
not be able to pass the test on his own, she obtained a copy of the
CDL manual and quizzed [him] for approximately 2 hours every day
for a period of two months by reading each question contained in
the CDL manual, giving [him] the answer, and repeating the process
until [he] was able to answer each question.509

503
504
505

506
507
508
509

Id.
Commonwealth v. VanDivner, 178 A.3d 108, 117 (Pa. 2018).
Id. at 118. During a subsequent PCRA hearing, an expert for the defense recalled
asking VanDivner the number of siblings he had which he answered “[by giving]
the name of two of his siblings.” Id. at 119. His ex-wife also testified how, “during
their marriage, Appellant did not work, and was unable to dial the telephone,
prepare a meal, do laundry, shop, use simple tools, read a map, or make simple
home repairs.” Id.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id.
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VanDivner only passed the CDL test because it was administered orally,
rather than in a written fashion, and the witness traveled with him when
he was trucking in order to maintain his logs and handle money at
tolls.510 Despite this evidence, the PCRA court found that VanDivner
was not intellectually disabled.511
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed, citing
testimony that [VanDivner] was unable to read, write, or perform
arithmetic; he was at a second-grade reading level; he was unable to
manage his finances; he worked at a sausage factory and as a disc
jockey, but required supervision at the sausage factory because he
had difficulty remembering what spices to include in the sausage
mix, and assistance in reading song titles when working as a disc
jockey; he neglected his health by refusing treatment for his
diabetes; and, although he had several relationships with women and
eventually was married, all of the relationships ultimately failed.512

The court further reasoned that, “the mere fact that [VanDivner] was
married several times and maintained relationships with his family does
not support the conclusion that [he] does not suffer from limited
adaptive functioning in the area of social skills.”513 The Pennsylvania
court also criticized the PCRA court for “conclud[ing] that
[VanDivner’s] ability to learn the content of the CDL study guide and
pass an oral version of the exam, as well as his ability to maintain
employment” as a truck driver, implied that he did not have adaptive
deficits.514 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that “the
evidence presented at [VanDivner’s] pretrial and PCRA
hearings . . . clearly demonstrate[d] that he suffers from significant
adaptive limitations in the areas of conceptual, practical, and social
skills[.]”515 Therefore, the court commuted his sentence from death to
life without parole.516

510
511
512
513
514
515
516

Id. at 120–21.
Id. at 121–22.
Id. at 122–23.
Id. at 123.
Id.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 130. Contrary to the PCRA’s characterization, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania observed that VanDivner “earned approximately 9 percent of what
the average American worker earned at the time, and was not able to hold a job
for a long period of time . . . . [Furthermore, he] was always accompanied by a
friend or family member on his trucking trips because Appellant could not read
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In its subsequent Commonwealth v. Cox decision, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania contended that Moore I “faulted the Texas
court’s focus on Moore’s adaptive strengths.”517 During the Atkins
hearing an expert for the defense “testified that the fact [Cox] achieved
his GED in prison did not disprove the diagnosis of intellectual
disability . . . [because Cox] only passed on his second try after 14 years
of preparation in a structured supportive setting.”518 The same expert
attested “that the failure of [Cox’s] schools to designate him as in need
of special education did not negate a diagnosis of intellectual
disability[.]”519 In contrast, the expert for the state referenced Cox’s
Department of Correction “records that reflected Appellant with normal
intelligence and adaptations, such as maintaining a job involving an 18step protocol, and passing a GED exam.”520 In its opinion, the PCRA
court “found significant the fact that school authorities never identified
Appellant as possessing learning disabilities despite a system in place
to do so.”521 The PCRA court also “found that [the Department of
Corrections] records do not support a showing of significant deficits in
adaptive functioning.”522 Following Moore I, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania acknowledged that, “in assessing an individual’s adaptive
behavior, courts should focus on the existence of any adaptive deficits
and not rely on adaptive strengths to deny relief.”523 Moreover, the
Commonwealth asserted that “its witnesses’ overemphasis on
Appellant’s strengths, including passing a GED exam, and maintaining
prison employment,” paralleled the expert testimony that the Moore I
Court forbid.524 After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of

517
518
519
520
521
522

523

524

the maps, count the money for the tolls, and had difficulty keeping up with the
logs.” Id. at 125.
Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 378 (Pa. 2019).
Id. at 380–81.
Id. at 381.
Id.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 383 (“The court noted that [Cox] navigated the procedure for numerous
grievances while in prison. The court found that [Cox’s] ability to perform a job
cleaning up blood and bodily fluid spills, which entails a specific multi-step
protocol, belied any deficit in adaptive functioning.”).
Id. at 386. “[The Commonwealth acknowledged] that the adaptive strengths
focused on by the PCRA court are comparable to those focused on by the court in
Moore [I], including the fact Appellant was never placed in a special needs class,
and his ability to perform menial labor.” Id. at 387.
Id. at 387.

74

UMass Law Review

v. 16 | 2

Pennsylvania agreed with the Commonwealth, ruling that “the PCRA
court misplaced its focus on [Cox’s] adaptive strengths as negating the
evidence of his adaptive deficits.”525
In a case with strikingly similar facts to VanDivner, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina found differently than Pennsylvania and
maintained that “the trial court did not base its decision [that Blackwell
was intellectually able] solely on the fact that Blackwell was able to
successfully obtain a commercial driver’s license and be employed as a
truck driver.”526 The trial court had summarized the relevant evidence
as demonstrating that Blackwell “was able to achieve his goal of
becoming a commercial truck driver, maintain employment with
consistent increases in his earnings, and raise two children during his
twenty-six-year marriage.”527 The expert for the defense “found the
[adaptive deficit test] results, other records, and additional information,
demonstrated that Blackwell had adaptive behavior deficits[.]”528
Contrarily, the expert for the state “relied instead on Blackwell’s
vocational history after the age of 18, his ability as an adult to obtain a
Commercial Driver’s license, and the fact that Blackwell was ‘on track’
to graduate when he dropped out of high school” in making the
determination that he did not have adaptive behavior deficits.529 Faced
with conflicting expert testimony, the trial court found that Blackwell
was not intellectually disabled because, among other things, “he
attended school regularly and did not fail a grade until high school, and
that he was able to earn high school credits before dropping out.”530
Dissenting Justice Pleicones alleged that the trial court “ignore[d] the
details which demonstrate[d] Blackwell’s significant limitations, such
as an inability to manage a household and live alone, to pay bills, etc.”531
In his dissent, Pleicones wrote, “I fear that the trial judge’s reliance on
Blackwell’s ‘perceived adaptive strengths’ will be found to have
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526

527
528
529
530
531

Id. at 392.
State v. Blackwell, 801 S.E.2d 713, 720 (S.C. 2017) cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 985
(2018).
Id. at 721.
Id. at 739 (Pleicones, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 740. The majority did not perceive the trial court to have erred because, “as
required by Moore [I], [it] carefully considered and weighed Blackwell’s adaptive
strengths against his adaptive deficits.” Id. at 721 n.11 (majority opinion).

2021

Modern Application of Moore v. Texas

75

unconstitutionally skewed his view of the evidence,” since Moore I
requires examining adaptive deficits rather than adaptive strengths.532
In his concurring opinion for the Texas CCA in Ex parte Wood,
Justice Newell described the habeas court as relying on “evidence [that]
shows how [Wood] has many adaptive strengths.”533 Newell considered
this emphasis problematic because the Moore I Court “required [states]
to focus upon adaptive deficits without placing ‘undue emphasis’ upon
adaptive strengths.”534 Although Newell conceded that “the habeas
court noted a great amount of evidence showing [Wood’s] adaptive
strengths, but a dearth of evidence demonstrating adaptive deficits,” he
nevertheless rejected the claim that “the habeas court, or this
Court, . . . placed undue emphasis on [Wood’s] adaptive strengths.”535
Moreover, Newell asserted that “[i]f we completely ignore the existence
of evidence demonstrating adaptive strengths, then this aspect of the
inquiry becomes nothing more than a legal choice to credit only
mitigation evidence” supporting LWOP instead of death.536 Newell
concluded that “[u]ltimately, Moore [I] does not prohibit courts from
considering adaptive strengths; it only prohibits placing ‘undue’
emphasis upon them.”537 Justice Alcala dissented, alleging that “[t]he
instant majority opinion continues to selectively focus on only
the . . . adaptive strengths that would support a determination that
applicant is not intellectually disabled[.]”538Contrary to the majority’s
approach, “clinical experts have counseled against viewing the presence
of adaptive strengths as evidence of the absence of adaptive
weaknesses.”539 Alcala interpreted Moore I as prohibiting states from:
(1) relying on adaptive strengths to disprove intellectual disabilities or
refute adaptive deficits; and (2) disregarding evidence of adaptive
deficits by attributing those deficits to another disorder or cause.540
532
533

534
535
536
537
538
539
540

Id. at 740 n.45 (Pleicones, J., dissenting).
Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (Newell, J.,
concurring).
Id. (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 n.9 (2017)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 687 (Alcala, J., dissenting).
Id. at 688.
The habeas court suggested, for example, “that [Wood’s] troubles in school could
be due to factors other than intellectual disability,” even though Moore I
“expressly recognized that other mental or physical impairments are common
comorbidities in intellectually disabled persons and are ‘not evidence that a person
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The Texas CCA, in its unpublished Thomas v. State opinion,
recounted evidence of Thomas’ adaptive deficits reported by the expert
for the defense:
[e]ssentially, he didn’t learn to drive. He had problems in school
being able to read and write and perform math. He had problems
making change, such that others would take advantage of him.
Because, when he would go to the store, he wouldn’t know the
amount of change to get back.
During those days, there were rotary telephones. He had difficulty
looking up phone numbers in the phone book, which we don’t have
to do anymore. But looking that up and making phone calls, he had
to have assistance doing that type of thing.541

The expert for the state also testified and the Texas CCA determined
that “[s]ome of the indicators of Thomas’s adaptive skills were books
that were found in Thomas’s cell that were seventh grade reading level,
Thomas’s ability to use money, and his ability to read a clock, a
thermometer, a calendar, etc.”542 The court commented on how the
expert for the state “concluded that Thomas ha[d] traits and features
consistent with an anti-social personality,” rather than intellectual
disabilities.543 The Texas CCA declared, “we find that [the expert for
the State’s] testimony improperly ‘overemphasized’ Thomas’s
‘perceived adaptive strengths,’ rather than focusing on adaptive
deficits.”544 The Texas CCA found that “the State’s position that
Thomas’s adaptive behaviors stemmed from a personality disorder
rather than intellectual disability . . . . deviate[d] ‘from [the] prevailing

541

542
543
544

does not also have intellectual disability.’” Id. at 688 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct.
1039, 1051 (2017)).
Thomas v. State, NO. AP-77,047, 2018 WL 6332526, at *10 (Tex. Crim. App.
Dec. 5, 2018).
Id. at *15.
Id.
Id. at *17 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017) (“In concluding that
Moore did not suffer significant adaptive deficits, the CCA overemphasized
Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths . . . . Moore’s adaptive strengths, in the
CCA’s view, constituted evidence adequate to overcome the considerable
objective evidence of Moore’s adaptive deficits. But the medical community
focuses the adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.”)). Similarly, when
Justice Newell concurred in Petetan v. State, he summarized Moore I as “noting
that the medical community focuses adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive
deficits rather than adaptive strengths and that [the Texas CCA] overemphasized
the defendant’s adaptive strengths.” No. AP-77,038, 2017 WL 4678670 at *1 n.4
(Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017).

2021

Modern Application of Moore v. Texas

77

clinical standards.’”545 Accordingly, it held that “Thomas [was] entitled
to a new punishment hearing.”546
D. Highlighting Behavior While Incarcerated
Courts from four different states interpreted Moore I as discouraging
a focus on defendants’ functioning while in prison. The Supreme Court
of Alabama in Ex parte Carroll, for example, recognized that Moore I
“criticized the Texas court for its emphasis on Moore’s improved
behavior in prison.”547 The Alabama court found that the lower court’s
decision was reliant upon the testimony of the state’s expert, which
detailed how “[t]he defendant, who has served as a cook in a prison
kitchen, was able to correctly describe . . . (1) how to bake food items
such as biscuits; (2) how to use a large mixer, and (3) the ingredients
that were used in some of the food items he made as a cook.”548 A
corrections officer also attested that Carroll “was able to follow
directions, complete tasks, and never had any problems with
communicating” while working in the prison kitchen.549
During its review of the case, the Supreme Court of Alabama
observed that “the circuit court placed great emphasis on the fact that
Carroll had passed the GED examination while in prison.”550
Additionally, the circuit court found the correctional officer’s testimony
to be “compelling” when he “stated that Carroll followed directions and
was a good kitchen worker and that he did not have problems
communicating with Carroll.”551 The investigator associated with the
case also presented “compelling” evidence when he “testified that
Carroll had eight or nine books in his prison cell, as well as a newspaper
clipping about his prior conviction and two Jet magazines.”552 Finally,
the circuit court found the state expert “to be persuasive” when she
relayed that Carroll told her:
545
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547
548
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550
551
552

Thomas, 2018 WL 6332526, at *18 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050
(2017) (“The CCA’s consideration of Moore’s adaptive functioning also deviated
from prevailing clinical standards and from the older clinical standards the court
claimed to apply.”)).
Id. at *19 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051 (2017)).
Carroll II, 300 So. 3d 59, 63 (Ala. 2019).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 73.
Id.
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although he had never owned an automatic-teller-machine (“ATM”)
card, he understood how a card worked because, on one occasion,
he was disciplined for using an ATM card number in violation of
prison rules. In addition, Carroll reported to her that he had
completed the eighth grade and that he had passed the GED
examination while in prison.553

Based on these testimonies, the circuit court “discredited” the defense
expert’s testimony that Carroll possessed adaptive deficits.554 The
Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the decision of the circuit court,
ruling it could not find “that the circuit court exceeded its discretion.”555
Given that the circuit court overwhelmingly relied on testimony about
Carroll’s functioning in prison to conclude that he did not have adaptive
deficits, the Supreme Court of Alabama’s affirmation of the circuit court
appears at odds with its description of Moore I as “criticiz[ing]” this
practice556 and the subsequent Moore II decision.557 The Supreme Court
of Alabama failed to find that the circuit court erred by prioritizing
testimony of Carroll’s alleged adaptive strengths while incarcerated
over the testimony of the expert for the defense, who properly focused
on Carroll’s adaptive deficits.
The Florida Supreme Court interpreted Moore I to forbid an
“overemphasis on adaptive strengths and improper focus on prison
conduct.”558 Although the Florida Supreme Court conceded that its
opinion in Wright v. State “discussed some of Wright’s adaptive
strengths and behavior in prison” and that “Moore [I], the DSM-5, and
AAIDD-11 all caution against overemphasis on that type of evidence,”
the court nevertheless perceived its ruling to comport with Moore I
because, “the crux of [its] decision rested on the competing expert
553
554
555
556

557

558

Id. at 73–74.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Id. at 63. Of relevance here, the Moore I Court wrote, “the [Texas] CCA stressed
Moore’s improved behavior in prison. Clinicians, however, caution against
reliance on adaptive strengths developed ‘in a controlled setting,’ as a prison
surely is.” 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017) (citation omitted) (quoting DSM–5, supra
note 180, at 38).
Moore II, which had already been decided but was never cited by the Supreme
Court of Alabama, even more clearly reprimanded the Texas CCA for “rel[ying]
heavily upon adaptive improvements made in prison.” 139 S. Ct. 666, 671 (2019).
At the end of its Moore II opinion, the Court declared, “[t]he length and detail of
the court’s discussion on these points is difficult to square with our caution against
relying on prison-based development.” Id.
Wright II, 256 So. 3d 766, 775–76 (Fla. 2018).
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medical testimony of [the state expert] and [the defense expert] instead
of independently weighing strengths and deficits or focusing on prison
conduct.”559 Thus the court did not consider itself to have “detrimentally
rel[ied] on strengths that Wright developed in prison to justify [its]
conclusion.”560 This ruling is concerning, however, because much of the
evidence that the state’s expert relied on to refute that Wright possessed
adaptive deficits consisted of alleged adaptive strengths he
demonstrated in prison. The Florida Supreme Court summarized this
evidence as follows:
Wright: (1) rewrites draft blog entries in his own words; (2) fully
communicates with other prisoners and prison staff; (3) listens to
others and takes advice, as evidenced by his brief period requesting
Kosher meals; (4) understands numbers and time; (5) knows the
time allocated for prison activities; (6) manages his prison canteen
fund and pays attention to his monthly statements; (7) managed his
own funds as an adolescent to buy necessities; (8) conducted basic
transactions before he was incarcerated; (9) was attentive to time
and number issues during the examination; (10) identifies his
attorneys by name and estimates the amount of time they have
represented him; (11) knows the difference between legal mail and
regular mail in the prison system; (12) understands that he needs his
attorneys because he has no legal training; (13) is receptive to the
suggestions of his attorneys; (14) wants his attorneys to prove that
he did not commit the crimes for which he was convicted; (15)
knows that he was sentenced to death and understands the reasoning
for his sentence; and (16) has performed some work on his case.561

The state expert’s testimony creates the impression that, in order to rule
as it did in light of Moore I, the Florida Supreme Court simply refused
to show proper deference to the Supreme Court of the United States
precedent.
Justice Pariente, who concurred in the result, identified “[t]he
important holding” in Moore I as “conduct in prison, a structured
environment, should not be relied on in assessing adaptive
functioning.”562 In Pariente’s view, “[w]hile there is nothing wrong with
mentioning either adaptive strengths or conduct in prison, it is improper
to rely on either factor to overcome the evidence of adaptive deficits to
559
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561
562

Id. at 777. When discussing the 2017 case, Florida’s Supreme Court alleged that
“[t]he only portion of Wright that touched on prison conduct was [its] recitation
of [the state expert’s] findings.” Id.
Id.
Wright I, 213 So. 3d at 899.
Wright II, 256 So. 3d at 780 (Pariente, J., concurring).
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deny a defendant’s intellectual disability claim.”563 Pariente
recommended applying the Moore I Court’s analysis by “focus[ing] on
the adaptive deficits and not . . . analyzing either adaptive strengths or
deficits in the context of a prison environment.”564 Nevertheless,
Pariente agreed with the holding of the majority because, “[r]egardless
of how this Court explained Wright’s intellectual disability claim in its
prior opinion, it is clear that the postconviction court properly analyzed
Wright’s claim.”565 Thus, Pariente ultimately “concur[red] in result but
[did] not agree with the unnecessary discussion of adaptive strengths
and prison behavior.”566
Justice Alcala, in her Ex parte Wood dissent, considered the
“majority opinion [to] improperly focus on applicant’s adaptive
strengths and his abilities in a controlled prison setting.”567 Alcala
observed that “clinical experts . . . . caution against considering
adaptive strengths arising in controlled settings like a prison.”568 She
dissented because the majority affirmed a flawed analysis that “fail[ed]
to comport with the current medical diagnostic framework” required by
Moore I.569
E. Discretion Afforded to State Courts
Initially, in Atkins, the Supreme Court of the United States professed
to “leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to
enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of
sentences.”570 However, after witnessing some courts treat this freedom
as a license to act in bad faith, the Court clarified in Hall that “Atkins
did not give the States unfettered discretion to define the full scope of
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Id. at 781.
Id. Expounding upon this proposal, Pariente noted “as the AAIDD correctly
explains, much of the clinical definition of adaptive behavior is much less relevant
in prisons, and in fact, a person with [intellectual disability] is likely to appear to
have stronger adaptive behavior in a structured environment such as a prison than
in society.” Id. at 782.
Id. at 782–83.
Id. at 783.
Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W. 3d 678, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (Alcala, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 688.
Id.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986)).
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the constitutional protection.”571 Indeed, “[i]f the States were to have
complete autonomy to define intellectual disabilit[ies] as they wished,
the Court’s decision in Atkins could become a nullity, and the Eighth
Amendment’s protection of human dignity would not become a
reality.”572 Consequently, the Hall Court considered “Atkins to provide
substantial guidance on the definition of intellectual disabilit[ies].”573
In the post-Moore I era, courts from five different states have cited
Hall to address the degree of discretion that states retain to choose their
own definitions and procedures for evaluating intellectual disabilities in
capital cases.574 The Supreme Court of Alabama, for example, alleged
that Moore I “did not specifically limit states to the definitions set forth
in the AAIDD-11 and DSM-5.”575 This interpretation is suspect because
the Moore I Court specifically referred to the DSM-5 and AAIDD-11 as
“the leading diagnostic manuals” on intellectual disabilities.576 The
Supreme Court of Alabama may be correct in semantics given that the
Moore I Court also declared, “being informed by the medical
community does not demand adherence to everything stated in the latest
medical guide[,]”577 but this statement should not be construed to imply
571
572
573

574

575
576
577

Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 719 (2014).
Id. at 720–21.
Id. at 721. Nevertheless, following Hall, the Texas CCA remained undeterred in
its commitment to the fictitious Briseno factors. In response, the Moore I Court
pronounced that “[t]he medical community’s current standards supply one
constraint on States’ leeway in this area[,]” before directing states to the DSM–5
and AAIDD–11 as appropriate current medical standards. 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1053
(2017).
In Moore I, the Supreme Court described the DSM–5 and the AAIDD–11 as the
“leading diagnostic manuals,” thereby establishing them as the current medical
standards to be applied by state courts. 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017). The Court
also stipulated that “[t]he medical community’s current standards supply one
constraint on States’ leeway in this area.” Id. at 1053. Based on these principles,
states clearly cannot find someone intellectually able when the practices outlined
in the DSM–5 or the AAIDD–11 would consider them intellectually disabled.
What is less clear is whether the Court intended to grant other materials published
by the APA or AAIDD a similar status as the DSM–5 and AAIDD–11, or whether
it perceived a difference between the clinical manuals published by the
organizations and their other views, as expressed in written publications. In other
words, do other publications besides the DSM–5 and AAIDD–11 from the APA
and AAIDD qualify as current medical standards or is this designation reserved
solely for the clinical manuals?
Carroll II, 300 So. 3d 59, 65 (Ala. 2019).
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1048.
Id. at 1049.
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that states may find someone intellectually able when current medical
diagnostic criteria would label them intellectually disabled. Instead, it is
more reasonable to assume that the Court’s holding in Moore I suggests
that states may find someone intellectually disabled who does not satisfy
current medical diagnostic criteria for intellectual disabilities. In other
words, states may depart from current medical standards for intellectual
disabilities in order to be more lenient, but they may not add additional
restrictions beyond the diagnostic criteria outlined in the DSM-5 or
AAIDD-11, which would reduce the number of people who qualify as
intellectually disabled according to current medical standards.
Some legal scholars argue that regardless of the state the case is in,
capital defendants should not have to provide evidence that their
intellectual disabilities existed before age eighteen.578 The Supreme
Court’s original rationale for exempting people with intellectual
disabilities from execution in Atkins supports this assertion. In Atkins,
the Court stated that intellectually disabled defendants are especially
likely to receive the death penalty during the sentencing phase due to
the
possibility of false confessions, but also . . . the lesser ability of
mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of
mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more
aggravating factors. Mentally retarded defendants may be less able
to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor
witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted
impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.579

All defendants with subaverage intellectual functioning and adaptive
deficits, “by definition,”580 face these limitations at trial, regardless of
whether they can demonstrate that their intellectual disabilities existed
before adulthood. Accordingly, it is counterintuitive for the Court to
have only intended for Atkins to protect a subset of the people identified
as having an “enhanced” risk of execution.581 Based upon the Atkins
Court’s rationale, the most reasonable interpretation of the Moore I
578

579
580
581

See Updegrove et al., supra note 166 at 544–45. See also James W. Ellis, Mental
Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 13–14 (2003). See generally Steven
J. Mulroy, Execution by Accident: Evidentiary and Constitutional Problems with
the “Childhood Onset” Requirement in Atkins Claims, 37 VT. L. REV. 591
(2013).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002).
Id. at 318.
Id. at 320.
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Court’s statement is that states may only depart from current medical
standards if doing so is necessary in order to ensure the “reliability and
fairness of capital proceedings against” them.582 As such, disregarding
the age of onset requirement—established by the DSM-5 and AAIDD11—would seem to fall within this exception.
The Alabama CCA quoted Moore I to note that “[t]he medical
community’s current standards supply one constraint on States’ leeway”
in defining intellectual disability because States must adhere to those
standards.583 The Arizona Supreme Court, in State v. Gates, also
recognized the Moore I Court as “holding that states do not have
unfettered discretion to reject medical community standards in defining
[intellectual disabilities].”584 Similarly, the California Supreme Court
acknowledged that “[t]he legal determination of intellectual disability
is, of course, distinct from a medical diagnosis[.]”585 Moreover, the
California Court wrote, “both our decisions and those of the United
States Supreme Court [in Hall and Moore I] contemplate that the
determination must be an individualized one, informed by the views of
medical experts.”586 Thus, the California Supreme Court rejected the
State’s argument that the factfinder had erred in evaluating Lewis for
adaptive deficits “according to ‘the most current authority on [the]
subject,’” instead of the now-outdated clinical manual originally used
by the Atkins Court.587 In its holding, the California Supreme Court
asserted that Moore I did not eliminate all ability for states to define
intellectual disabilities, however, it noted that in creating those
definitions states were prevented from disregarding current medical
standards, as detailed in the most up to date clinical manuals.
In Quince v. State, the Florida Supreme Court cited the Moore I
Court’s reasoning that “Hall indicated that being informed by the
medical community does not demand adherence to everything stated in
the latest medical guide” in order to justify ignoring the Flynn effect.588
The Florida Supreme Court contended that it was immaterial that the
582
583

584
585
586
587
588

Id. at 307.
Carroll I, 300 So. 3d 51, 55 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct.
1039, 1053 (2017)).
State v. Gates, 410 P.3d 433, 435 (Ariz. 2018).
In re Lewis, 417 P.3d 756, 766 (Cal. 2018).
Id. at 766–67.
Id. at 766.
Quince v. State, 241 So. 3d 58, 62 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039,
1049 (2017)).
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AAIDD organization had recently published a book that “now
advocate[s] the adjustment of all IQ scores in Atkins cases that were
derived from tests with outdated norms to account for the Flynn
effect.”589 When the Florida Court disregarded the Flynn effect in this
case, Quince’s IQ scores were rendered above 70 even after accounting
for the SEM.590 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that he did
not meet the first prong for intellectual disabilities.591 Moreover, the
Florida Supreme Court had previously held, “[i]f the defendant fails to
prove any one of these [three] components, the defendant will not be
found to be intellectually disabled.”592 The Court, therefore affirmed
that, “because Quince failed to meet the significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning prong (even when the SEM [was] taken into
account), he could not have met his burden to demonstrate that he is
intellectually disabled.”593
The issue of state discretion is further complicated due to the fact
that the DSM-5 itself recognizes the Flynn effect as one of the “[f]actors
that may affect test scores,” which could reasonably be construed as
confirming that the Flynn effect is indeed part of current medical
standards.594 Critics who oppose the ramifications of adopting this view
will likely justify their position by noting, as the Florida Supreme Court
did, that the Moore I Court “indicated that being informed by the
medical community does not demand adherence to everything stated in
the latest medical guide.”595 Whether APA and AAIDD publications—
apart from the clinical manuals themselves—qualify as current medical
standards is undoubtedly gray and requires clarification from the Court.
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court evidently considered the
publication in question, which recommended adjusting IQ scores to
589

590
591
592
593
594
595

Id. The book in question, notes that “Not only is there a scientific consensus that
the Flynn effect is a valid and real phenomenon, there is also a consensus that
individually obtained IQ test scores derived from tests with outdated norms must
be adjusted to account for the Flynn effect, particularly in Atkins cases.” AM.
ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, THE DEATH PENALTY AND
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES, 160 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015). Florida’s
Supreme Court noted the defense based its argument on this passage by partially
quoting it in its opinion. Quince, 241 So. 3d at 61.
Quince, 241 So. 3d at 60–61.
Id. at 62.
Id. (quoting Salazar v. State, 188 So. 3d 799, 812 (Fla. 2016)).
Id.
See DSM–5, supra note 180, at 37.
Quince, 241 So. 3d at 62 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017)).
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account for the Flynn effect, to be part of current medical standards
since it cited Moore I’s caveat that states do not need to follow
everything written in the manuals.596 Consequently, the Florida
Supreme Court must have erred when it disregarded what it seemingly
recognized as part of current medical standards to determine that Quince
was not intellectually disabled.597
In Rodriguez v. State, the Florida Supreme Court observed that the
circuit court considered the expert for the state the “most credible” when
he “testified that according to his tests, Rodriguez was malingering and
that none of his IQ scores below 70 were reliable.”598 Consequently, the
circuit court discounted evidence presented by the expert for the
defense, including “an IQ [test] score of 64.”599 Because the circuit court
prioritized the state expert’s opinion over the defense expert’s,
Rodriguez alleged that the “credibility findings made by the circuit court
contradict medical standards detailed in a publication of the
[AAIDD].”600 The Court disagreed that “credibility findings are
improper when they conflict with medical standards,”601 because Moore
I indicated that “being informed by the medical community does not
demand [state] adherence to everything stated in the latest medical
guide.”602
596

597

598
599
600

601
602

The Moore I Court appears to have given the states discretion to broaden Atkins
protections so that they may find capital defendants intellectually disabled even if
they do not fully satisfy current medical standards. This discretion, however, does
not permit states to find capital defendants intellectually able when current
medical standards would consider them intellectually disabled. See Updegrove et
al., supra note 166, at 542 (“[A]ny state that found a capital defendant
intellectually able who would meet the criteria for intellectual disability under the
DSM–5 or AAIDD–11 would contradict the current medical consensus.”).
Quince, 241 So. 3d at 63 (“For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order
denying Quince’s renewed motion for a determination of intellectual disability as
a bar to execution.”).
Rodriguez v. State, 219 So. 3d 751, 757 (Fla. 2017).
Id. at 754.
Id. at 756. Specifically, Rodriguez argued that “[m]edical standards indicate that
experts cannot accurately evaluate adaptive functioning in a prison setting[,]” id.
at 757, and that the Florida Supreme Court was wrong to assess “both long-term
and current adaptive functioning” because it “encourages the unreliable practice
of evaluating defendants in prison.” Id. Florida’s Supreme Court disagreed, noting
that “the circuit court considered more than just adaptive functioning testing
conducted in prison.” Id. at 758.
Id. at 756.
Id. (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017)).
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Finally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania acknowledged that
states retained some degree of discretion when it quoted the Moore I
Court as saying, “Hall indicated that being informed by the medical
community does not demand adherence to everything stated in the latest
medical guide. But neither does our precedent license disregard of
current medical standards.”603 Thus, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
understood Moore I to signify that “[the] medical community’s current
standards supply one constraint on State’s leeway [in enforcing
Atkins].”604
F. Lay Stereotypes
Courts from six different states have interpreted Moore I to mean
that they may not rely on lay stereotypes about intellectual disabilities.
The Alabama CCA, for example, understood the Moore I Court to have
“held that States may not create their own factors for accessing [sic]
adaptive deficits if those factors deviate from clinical standards and,
instead, rely on ‘lay perceptions of intellectual disabilit[ies].’“605 The
Court did not, however, allege that the circuit court relied on lay
stereotypes about intellectual disabilities when deciding the case.606
In People v. Woodruff, the California Supreme Court considered
whether the state attorney engaged in misconduct when he informed
jurors of the following:
[the defense] counsel told you that your opinion or people’s opinion
of whether or not Mr. Woodruff is mentally retarded doesn’t matter.
But that’s not true. If it didn’t matter, you wouldn’t be asked to make
this finding. If we only wanted professionals to come in here and
make the decision, there would be no need for a jury. Your opinion
does matter. That’s what we’re asking you to do . . . . And I submit
this to you: If a person doesn’t look retarded or act retarded, it’s
because they’re not retarded. It doesn’t take any professional to let
you know that.607

603

604
605

606

607

Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 377 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Moore I, 137 S.
Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017)).
Id. at 378 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1053 (2017)).
Carroll I, 300 So. 3d 51, at 55 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Moore I, 137 S.
Ct. 1039, 1051 (2017)).
The Alabama CCA was not considering the issue of whether the circuit court
relied on lay stereotypes when assessing intellectual disabilities. The CCA merely
raised the issue as one factor that limits states’ discretion.
People v. Woodruff, 421 P.3d 588, 649 (Cal. 2018).
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In reviewing the case on appeal, the California Supreme Court noted
that the Moore I Court wrote, “the medical profession has endeavored
to counter lay stereotypes of the intellectually disabled . . . . Those
stereotypes, much more than medical and clinical appraisals, should
spark skepticism.”608 Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court
stated, “[a]ssuming without deciding that the comment was erroneous,
we conclude the error was harmless because it was said in passing and
the prosecutor went on to review the evidence, including the experts’
findings, to support his contention that defendant was not intellectually
disabled.”609 Because the California Supreme Court did not consider
“the prosecutor’s comments as a whole” to be problematic, it ruled that
the “defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.”610
The Florida Supreme Court considered Moore I to forbid using the
Briseno factors because they “had no medical or legal authority to
support them, and they reflected a misinformed layperson’s
understanding of [intellectual disabilities].”611 The court did not,
however, judge the post-conviction court to be in violation of Moore I,
because “current medical understanding served as the basis for the
rejection of Wright’s claim, which differentiates this case from Moore
[I] where the [Texas] CCA relied on outdated medical standards and lay
perceptions of [intellectual disabilities].”612
As part of her dissent from the Supreme Court of Missouri’s
majority opinion in Johnson v. State, Justice Stith summarized the
Briseno factors as “ask[ing] counsel and family members to give
anecdotal impressions of whether the person, essentially, has behaved
how they would expect an intellectually disabled person to behave.”613
Moore I, Stith asserted, “rejected this sanctioned use of anecdotal
impressions of lay individuals,” and instead “held [that] states should
require clinical evaluations of adaptive behaviors[.]”614 The majority
found that Johnson alleged that he received incompetent legal
representation because his counsel did not realize, based upon his
interactions with Johnson, that Johnson was intellectually disabled.615
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615

Id. at 649 (quoting Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 (2017)).
Id.
Id. at 649–50.
Wright II, 256 So. 3d 766, 774 (Fla. 2018).
Id. at 775.
Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 916 (Mo. 2019) (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 905 (majority opinion).
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Stith, in turn, argued that “[t]he issue is not that his counsel should have
recognized his intellectual disabilities through his interactions with Mr.
Johnson – as previously discussed, Moore I and Moore II reject use of
lay perceptions as a permissible basis for determining intellectual
disability.”616 Accordingly, Stith contended that the majority failed to
properly understand Johnson’s claim, which in reality focused on his
counsel’s woeful ignorance of capital punishment law, as it pertained to
intellectual disabilities, and his inattention to expert testimony
suggesting Johnson was intellectually disabled.617
In Commonwealth v. Cox, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
conceded that, in light of Moore I, the PCRA court erred because “courts
should be guided by the prevailing diagnostic and assessment tools and
principles rather than lay perceptions of what constitutes intellectual
disability.”618 The court qualified the Commonwealth’s reasoning,
noting “[t]hat is not to say that lay testimony about factual observations
of an individual’s behavior is not relevant to an expert’s assessment of
behavioral deficits.”619 The Pennsylvania court determined that “the
PCRA court relied on the apparent failure of the lay witnesses to act on
their asserted perceptions of Appellant’s deficits to discount the
existence of those deficits. This is squarely at odds with Moore I’s
admonition against focusing on non-clinical lay perceptions.”620 In
other words, because lay people around Cox did not treat him as
intellectually disabled, the PCRA court regarded this as evidence that
he was, in fact, not actually intellectually disabled. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania then highlighted how the Moore I Court “particularly
disproved reliance on the Briseno factors as an attempt to impose a
616
617

618
619
620

Id. at 922. (Stith, J., dissenting).
Justice Stith also wrote that “[t]he United States Supreme Court [in Moore I and
Moore II] has twice reversed a death penalty conviction when a court based its
determination of lack of intellectual disability on the court’s personal observations
of the defendant rather than on scientific and medical criteria.” Id. at 909. Here,
Stith appears to be implying that Johnson’s attorney committed a glaring error by
assuming, based solely on their personal interactions, and despite medical
evidence to the contrary, that Johnson was not a person with intellectual
disabilities. Stith thought this error violated Moore I and Moore II. Thus, even
attorneys who are “professionals” cannot substitute their own judgment and
forego an examination when determining whether their client is intellectually
disabled. This is also an example of relying on lay stereotypes rather than current
medical standards. Id. at 910–11.
Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 386 (Pa. 2019).
Id. at n.14.
Id. at 387.
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consensus of the citizenry about who should be eligible for the death
sentence rather than criteria accepted in the professional and medical
community.”621 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
concluded that the PCRA court:
relied on the Briseno factors to conclude the absence of intervention
by the lay witnesses was a reason to conclude an absence of any
deficits. This reliance is clearly erroneous in light of Moore [I]. The
ability of lay persons to recognize intellectual disability, let alone
know what steps to take to secure a diagnosis for supportive
services, is not a part of the professional diagnostic criteria that
courts have been directed to employ.622

Justice Alcala, in her dissent from the Texas CCA’s Majority
opinion in Battaglia v. State, wrote Moore I taught that, when evaluating
capital defendants for intellectual disabilities, “courts should not resort
to stereotypes about the intellectually disabled, but should instead look
to current medical/clinical appraisals to determine whether a particular
person meets the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability.”623 This
same principle, she advocated, should apply with equal force to
competency-for-execution evaluations, because on remand the Panetti
Court ordered the trial court to show deference to the “conclusions of
physicians, psychiatrists, and other experts in the field[.]”624
Lastly, when concurring with the Texas CCA’s Majority opinion in
Ex parte Wood, Justice Newell described Moore I as, “not[ing] that we
are supposed to avoid lay perceptions and stereotypes regarding
intellectual disability.”625 Newell did not, however, allege that the
Majority opinion relied on lay stereotypes about intellectual disabilities.
G. Miscellaneous
Courts from four different states cited Moore I in a context other
than previously discussed. In State v. Rodriguez, for example, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina’s observed that it was “not
persuaded . . . that Moore [I] has any bearing on the intellectual
disability issue that defendant has actually raised, which is whether the
trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set the jury’s verdict with
621
622
623

624
625

Id. at 388.
Id.
Battaglia v. State, 537 S.W.3d 57, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (Alcala, J.,
dissenting) (citing Moore I, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 (2017)).
Id. (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 962 (2007)).
Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
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respect to the intellectual disability issue aside.”626 As a result, although
the Supreme Court of North Carolina admitted that the “defendant did
present sufficient evidence to support a determination that he should be
deemed exempt from the imposition of the death penalty on intellectual
disability grounds,” it refused to overturn the jury’s finding that
Rodriguez was not intellectually disabled because the state expert’s
testimony “tend[ed] to support a contrary determination,” and the issue
ultimately “was a matter for the jury rather than for this Court.”627
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Batts,
cited Moore I to establish that the term “mental retardation” used in
Atkins held the same meaning as the term “intellectual disabilit[ies]”
used in subsequent Supreme Court cases.628 In Dellinger v. State,
Dellinger contended that, because “determinations of intellectual
disabilit[ies] [had] expanded greatly, requiring consideration of many
more factors than those considered at the time of his trial in 1996[,]” he
was entitled to a new ruling on his intellectual disabilities.629 The
Tennessee CCA acknowledged that Moore I motivated Dellinger’s
petition, since it was the Supreme Court’s latest ruling on intellectual
disabilities at the time he filed the petition.630 The court, however,
dismissed the argument, declaring that the cases Dellinger cited,
including Atkins, Hall, and Moore I, constituted “changes in the law that
occurred several years after his trial.”631
In its Ex parte King decision, the Texas CCA denied King’s petition
for a stay of execution. Justice Keasler dissented, and proclaimed that
[i]n light of this Court’s recent earnest, but ultimately unsuccessful,
attempts to implement new Supreme Court precedent in deathpenalty cases [(Moore II)], and especially in light of the horrible
stain this Court’s reputation would suffer if King’s claims of
innocence are one day vindicated . . . I think we ought to take our
time and decide this issue unhurriedly.632
626
627
628
629

630

631
632

State v. Rodriguez, 814 S.E.2d 11, 28 n.5 (N.C. 2018).
Id. at 28.
Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 448 n.20 (Pa. 2017).
Dellinger v. State, No. E2018-00135-CCA-R3-ECN, 2019 WL 1754701, at *3
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2019).
Although the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals issued its ruling on April 17,
2019, Dellinger presumably filed his petition prior to the United States Supreme
Court ruling in Moore II on February 19, 2019.
Dellinger, 2019 WL 1754701, at *3.
Ex parte King, No. WR-49,391-03, 2019 WL 1769023, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App.
Apr. 22, 2019) (Keasler, J., dissenting).
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As part of an unpublished opinion, Ex parte Long I, the Texas CCA
“determined that applicant’s execution should be stayed pending further
order of this Court” due to Moore I, which represented “new law.”633
The Texas CCA ruled again in Ex parte Long II ordering the trial court
to convene “a live hearing to further develop evidence and make a new
recommendation to this Court on the issue of intellectual disability”
following its previous suspension of Long’s sentence after Moore I.634
Beyond this, the Texas CCA cited Moore I to justify a stay of execution
in several other unpublished opinions, including Ex parte Segundo,635
and Ex parte Williams,636 where the court also ordered a live hearing on
the issue of William’s alleged intellectual disabilities.
In Ex parte Wood, the Texas CCA noted that Moore I prompted its
review of Wood’s case, but “conclude[d] that no further record
development or fact findings [were] needed and that Applicant [was]
not entitled to relief.”637 As the Texas CCA explained, “[t]he Moore
decisions changed the legal analysis for reviewing intellectual-disability
claims in Texas, but Applicant’s evidence relating to intellectual
disability is already in the record.”638 When dissenting from the Texas
CCA’s unpublished opinion in Petetan v. State, Justice Keller asserted
that Petetan’s petition failed to “raise a claim based upon Moore v. Texas
[I], and it [did] not make any claim relating to the Briseno factors—
despite the fact that Moore [I] was decided shortly after we handed
down our opinion in this case.”639
IV. CONCLUSION
In the time since the Supreme Court of the United States delivered
its Moore I decision in 2017, and follow-up Moore II decision in early
2019, state courts have cited these opinions to address a variety of issues
633

634

635

636

637
638
639

Ex parte Long, NO. WR-76,324-02, 2017 WL 3616644, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App.
Aug. 21, 2017).
Ex parte Long, NO. WR-76,324-02, 2018 WL 3217506, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App.
June 27, 2018).
Ex parte Segundo, NO. WR-70,963-02, 2018 WL 4856580, at *1 (Tex. Crim.
App. Oct. 5, 2018).
Ex parte Williams, NO. WR-71,296-03, 2018 WL 2717039, at *2 (Tex. Crim.
App. June 5, 2018).
Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678, 679–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Id. at 681.
Petetan v. State, NO. AP-77,038, 2017 WL 4678670, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct.
18, 2017) (Keller, J., dissenting).
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related to evaluating intellectual disabilities in capital cases. Some of
these issues are relatively straightforward, with state courts either
properly applying Moore I or Moore II or willfully disregarding their
instruction under the guise of misunderstanding. Other issues, however,
highlight gray areas that require further clarification from the Court.
Table 4 presents a list of issues raised by state courts post-Moore I
broken down according to whether: (1) the Supreme Court has already
provided clear guidance on the issue; or (2) additional clarification is
required from the Court. Until such a time as the Supreme Court
addresses the issues listed in the latter category, they are likely to
continue requiring state courts’ attention with some regularity.
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V. APPENDIX
Table 1. List of State Court Cases in the Twenty-Eight Death Penalty
States Citing Moore I or Moore II.
State

Number
of Cases

Case Citations
Callen v. State, 284 So. 3d 177 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017)
Carroll v. State, 300 So. 3d 51 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017)
Ex parte Lane, 286 So. 3d 61 (Ala. 2018)
State v. Carroll, 300 So. 3d 59 (2019)
Graham v. State, 299 So. 3d 273 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019)
State v. Gates, 410 P.3d 433 (Ariz. 2018)
Lard v. State, 2020 Ark. 110, 595 S.W.3d 355
In re Lewis, 417 P.3d 756 (Cal. 2018)
People v. Woodruff, 421 P.3d 588 (Cal. 2018)
Glover v. State, 226 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 2017)
Rodriguez v. State, 219 So. 3d 751 (Fla. 2017)
Quince v. State, 241 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 2018)
Wright v. State, 256 So. 3d 766 (Fla. 2018)
Cawthon v. State, 830 S.E.2d 270 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)

Alabama

5

Arizona
Arkansas

1
1

California

2

Florida

4

Georgia
Idaho
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana

1
0
0
1
1
0

Mississippi

2

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska

1
0
1

Nevada

2

North
Carolina

1

State v. Rodriguez, 814 S.E.2d 11 (N.C. 2018)

Ohio

3

State v. Ford, 158 Ohio St. 3d 139, 2019-Ohio-2284, 140
N.E. 3d 616
State v. Jackson, 2020-Ohio-4015, 157 N.E. 3d 240
State v. Jackson, 2020-Ohio-4914, No. 108558, 2020 WL
6075698 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2020)

Oklahoma
Oregon

0
1

Pennsylvania

3

State v. Thurber, 420 P.3d 389 (Kan. 2018)
Woodall v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2018)
State v. Russell, 2015-KA-00245-SCT (Miss. 2017) (en
banc)
Carr v. State, 2017-CA-01481-SCT (Miss. 2019)
Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895 (Mo. 2019)
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Table 2. Interpretations of Moore I and Moore II by State Courts in the
Twenty-Eight Death Penalty States.
State

1. Current
Medical
Standards

2. Standard
Error of
Measurement

3. Highlighting
Adaptive
Deficits

4. Highlighting
Behavior
While
Incarcerated
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South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
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Wyoming
Total Number
of States
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No
No
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No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
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No
No
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-

13

10

9

4

1

Indicates state courts have not cited Moore I or Moore II or have issued
opinions after submission of this Article.
Table 3. Additional Interpretations of Moore I and Moore II by State
Courts in the Twenty-Eight Death Penalty States.
State
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky

5. Discretion Afforded
to State Courts
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

6. Lay
Stereotypes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

7. Miscellaneous
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
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Table 4. Summary of Issues Raised by State Courts Post-Moore I that
are Either Clear or Require Additional Clarification from the U.S.
Supreme Court.
U.S. Supreme Court Has Already Provided Clear Guidance
1. Courts may not require a defendant to meet additional criteria to
prove their intellectual disabilities beyond the diagnostic criteria found in
the most recent versions of the DSM and AAIDD manuals (currently the
DSM-5 and AAIDD-11).
2. Clinicians may interview lay persons such as family members,
friends, neighbors, teachers, employers, and others who knew the
defendant as part of an intellectual disabilities evaluation, but courts may
not rely on the testimony or opinions of non-clinicians to justify
determining that a defendant is not intellectually disabled.
3. Courts may not base determinations of a defendant’s intellectual
disabilities on their alleged adaptive strengths, even if those strengths are
perceived to be directly related to a specific, relevant adaptive deficit.
Courts may only focus on the defendant’s adaptive deficits, not their
strengths, when evaluating their adaptive functioning.
4. Courts may not rely on the defendant’s functioning while in prison
to justify determining that they are not intellectually disabled.
5. Courts may not prohibit defendants from presenting evidence of
their adaptive deficits, regardless of how high their IQ score(s) is/are.
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6. Courts may not disregard evidence of adaptive deficits by attributing
those deficits to another cause besides intellectual disabilities.
7. Courts may not, under any circumstances for any reason, use a
standard error of measurement less than +5/-5 for a defendant’s IQ test
scores, or narrow the range provided by this standard error of measurement
after applying it to the actual IQ test score.
8. Courts may not disregard IQ test scores based on how long ago the
test was administered if the test in-question was considered to meet current
medical standards at the time it was administered.
9. Courts may not rely on lay stereotypes about intellectual disabilities.
10 Courts may not interpret the failure of the defendant’s family
members, friends, neighbors, teachers, employers, or others who knew the
defendant to treat them as intellectually disabled as evidence that the
defendant is, in fact, not intellectually disabled.
Requires Additional Clarification from the U.S. Supreme Court
1. Does the Court consider the Flynn effect to be part of current
medical standards? If the Court does, do states have to adjust defendants’
IQ scores to account for the Flynn effect?
2. Do defendants who demonstrate subaverage intellectual functioning
and adaptive deficits, but cannot provide evidence that these existed before
age 18 or during the developmental period, qualify for Atkins protections?
3. Do courts have to rely on current medical standards when evaluating
defendants for competency-to-be-executed?
4. What does the Court mean when it says that states do not have to
follow everything written in the most recent clinical manuals?
5. Does the Court consider other publications from the American
Psychiatric Association (APA) and the American Association on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), besides the DSM5 and AAIDD-11, respectively, to be part of current medical standards? If
the Court does, do states have to abide by these current medical standards
as well?

